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ENLIGHTENED REGULATORY CAPTURE 
David Thaw* 
Abstract: Regulatory capture generally evokes negative images of private interests 
exerting excessive influence on government action to advance their own agendas at the 
expense of the public interest. There are some cases, however, where this conventional 
wisdom is exactly backwards. This Article explores the first verifiable case, taken from 
healthcare cybersecurity, where regulatory capture enabled regulators to harness private 
expertise to advance exclusively public goals. Comparing this example to other attempts at 
harnessing industry expertise reveals a set of characteristics under which regulatory capture 
can be used in the public interest: (1) legislatively mandated adoption of recommendations 
by an advisory committee comprising private interests and “reduced-bias” subject matter 
experts; (2) relaxed procedural constraints for committee action to prevent internal 
committee capture; and (3) opportunities for committee participation to be worthwhile for 
representatives of private parties beyond the mere opportunity to advance their own interests. 
This Article presents recommendations based on those characteristics as to how and when 
legislatures may endeavor to replicate this success in other industries to improve both the 
legitimacy and efficacy of the regulatory process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Traditional academic scholarship and political discourse generally 
view the concept of regulatory capture in a negative light. Indeed, 
empirical results demonstrate many examples of regulatory capture 
generating results contrary to the public interest, or at least servicing a 
small subset of private interests at the expense of goals articulated to 
serve broader segments of the polity. 
Despite this generally negative view, some recent scholarship 
speculates that regulatory capture may be used to advance more “public” 
goals.1 This Article takes a similar position, advancing the work of Dorit 
Rubinstein Reiss and Lawrence Baxter by providing a concrete 
empirical example of regulatory capture used to advance public goals. 
Cybersecurity2 presents a curious case where traditional concepts of 
capture—in which entities with power in a regulatory process use that 
power to advance their private interests3—do not seem to hold. Rather 
than advancing their private interests at the expense of articulated public 
goals,4 the entities used that power to ensure the production of strong 
and effective security regulations even at a higher cost to themselves. 
Stated differently, structural characteristics of the regulatory process in 
the cybersecurity context arguably forced alignment of these regulated 
entities’ interests with the “public interests” articulated by the 
legislature. 
This Article explores the possibility of engaging private expertise 
1. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Baxter, “Capture” in Financial Regulation: Can We Channel it Toward 
the Common Good?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175 (2011); Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, The 
Benefits of Capture, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569 (2012). 
2. As noted by Professor Andrea Matwyshyn, “[r]eferring to all of information security, 
particularly in private sector contexts, as ‘cybersecurity’ is technically incorrect.” Andrea M. 
Matwyshyn, Hacking Speech: Informational Speech and the First Amendment, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 
795, 817 n.99 (2013). Matwyshyn describes this misnomer as ignoring the aspects of physical 
security inherent in “holistic” protection of data maintained by an enterprise. Id. I concur with this 
assessment, and further suggest, as consistent with the Administrative/Technical/Physical 
breakdown adopted by the healthcare cybersecurity example (42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d)(2) (2006)), 
that such a characterization also overlooks the administrative aspects involved in protecting security 
information. See David Thaw, Criminalizing Hacking, Not Dating: Reconstructing the CFAA Intent 
Requirement, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 907 (2013) (discussing the distinction between 
purely technical restrictions on computer usage and comprehensive administrative, technical, and 
physical restrictions thereon). Cybersecurity remains the common term with which most readers 
will be familiar, and thus I utilize that term when describing the matter generally. In Part II, when 
considering the technical details of the cybersecurity example in context, I use the term 
“information security” when technologically appropriate. 
3. Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 43–46 (1982). 
4. In this case, the “public” goals articulated in the underlying organic (or enabling) statute 
pursuant to which the rulemaking process in question proceeded. 
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through certain forms of regulatory capture to increase the legitimacy 
and efficacy of the regulatory process. Previous work on consensual 
rulemaking received mixed reviews in administrative law literature.5 The 
seminal body of work on this type of hybrid rulemaking, conducted by 
Professor Philip Harter, led to the Negotiated Rulemaking Act (NRA) 
amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). While the 
results have been mixed, the balance of academic scholarship and 
agency choice suggests that current approaches to engaging private 
expertise have not achieved their full promise. 
Building on Reiss’ and Baxter’s speculation and the groundwork laid 
by Harter, this Article presents cybersecurity as a successful case of 
engaging private expertise through legislatively encoded regulatory 
capture that aligned private with public interests. It contrasts this 
example with cases of negotiated rulemaking, a process also designed to 
engage private expertise but criticized for being too easily subjugated by 
private interests.6 Based on these examinations and a thorough empirical 
treatment of the cybersecurity example,7 I posit a set of general 
characteristics describing the regulatory environment/subject matter 
suggestive of when capture-like engagement of private expertise may 
succeed in aligning public and private interests. I describe this process, 
designed to leverage regulatory capture to harness private expertise for 
public goals, as Enlightened Regulatory Capture. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I traces the development of 
consensual rulemaking and contextualizes this work within the existing 
debate on the NRA and regulatory capture more broadly. It examines 
case studies of negotiated rulemaking in action and discusses the 
efficacy of this process in the context of engaging private expertise to 
increase efficiency and legitimacy in administrative action. Part II 
examines the curious case of cybersecurity rulemaking under the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) in which 
representatives of private entities used their expertise to advance public 
interests. To the best of my knowledge, this is a unique circumstance, 
5. Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated 
Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997); William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: 
Regulatory Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351 (1997); Philip 
J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL L.J. 32 (2000); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Achieving Policymaking Consensus: The (Unfortunate) 
Waning of Negotiated Rulemaking, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 987 (2008); Andrew P. Morriss et al., 
Choosing How to Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179 (2005). 
6. See generally Funk, supra note 5. 
7. David Thaw, The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2241838. 
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created possibly by Congressional accident.8 This Part describes how the 
members of the pre-rulemaking committee, all of whom were 
representatives of interested parties, utilized their substantive expertise 
to develop the best regulations without prioritizing their entities’ private 
interests. Finally, Part III explores the particular characteristics of the 
cybersecurity example that make capture an effective means to engage 
private expertise for public goals. Building on the work of Professor 
Harter, it generalizes a set of characteristics indicative of when such an 
approach may be successful and uses the analysis from Part I to 
hypothesize what other industrial sectors are suitable to regulation of this 
form. Finally, this Article concludes by recommending further 
Congressional and agency experimentation with this process and 
providing some suggestions for such experimentation. 
In sum, this Article demonstrates two critical points. First, the concept 
of engaging private expertise through regulatory capture has not been a 
unilateral failure and deserves further consideration. Second, when 
properly structured and applied to suitable cases, this capture-like 
function may in fact have the effect opposite its traditional conception: it 
will increase both the representative legitimacy and the efficacy of the 
regulatory process. 
I. TRADITIONAL CONCEPTIONS OF REGULATORY 
CAPTURE 
The term “regulatory capture” traditionally evokes negative 
connotations of backroom dealing, placement of industry-friendly 
individuals in key regulatory positions, and the breakdown of the 
regulatory process that grinds it to a proverbial halt. The concept often 
conflates with the idea of any private involvement in administrative 
rulemaking and adjudicatory processes. While private involvement 
certainly can have (and has had9) socially undesirable effects, ignoring 
private expertise overlooks a wealth of valuable technical information 
about the regulated subject matter.10 
Tensions between regulators and regulated entities increased 
substantially during the second half of the twentieth century. Private 
interests, dissatisfied with regulatory outcomes, responded to this 
8. See infra note 134.  
9. Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency 
Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337 (2013); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL 
J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). 
10. Reiss, supra note 1. 
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perceived “lack of representativeness” by engaging in various methods 
to exert influence over the process to achieve their private ends. This 
influence, commonly believed to be contrary to the public interest and at 
the time most easily achieved through placement of sympathetic 
individuals in key government positions, became known as regulatory 
capture. 
The concept of negotiated rulemaking rose both as a response to the 
regulatory breakdown described above and as a compromise allowing 
regulated entities meaningful access to the rulemaking process. 
Professor Philip Harter first proposed the idea in his article, The Political 
Legitimacy and Judicial Review of Consensual Rules.11 This concept of 
consensual rulemaking, as Harter first described it, gained legitimacy 
during the 1980s12 and ultimately was adopted by Congress in 1990 in 
the NRA.13 Negotiated rulemaking promised a solution to the tensions 
above, without the negative risks traditionally associated with regulatory 
capture.14 Its success in this regard, however, remains the subject of 
dispute.15 
This Part traces the evolution described above as a backdrop to Part 
II. Other works present excellent comprehensive historical accounts of 
this evolution, and this Article does not seek to replicate such accounts. 
Rather, this Part contextualizes portions of that history relevant to the 
hypothesis that attempts to harness private expertise in regulation have, 
thus far, been mostly counterproductive or at least inefficient. It begins 
with a brief examination of the history of regulatory capture and the rise 
of negotiated rulemaking. It then proceeds to examine cases of 
negotiated rulemaking, including where and why it was and was not 
used by agencies. There have been a few notable successes, but 
generally negotiated rulemaking is not characterized as successful in 
scholarly literature. This Part concludes by arguing that, absent the 
imposition of certain constraints, negotiated rulemaking and other forms 
of hybrid rulemaking are at high risk of the negative aspects of 
regulatory capture. Part II then presents the case of information security 
regulations as a notable counter-example escaping these negative effects. 
11. Philip J. Harter, The Political Legitimacy and Judicial Review of Consensual Rules, 32 AM. 
U. L. REV. 471, 476–85 (1983). 
12. See Funk, supra note 5; Harter, supra note 5; Harter, supra note 11. 
13. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570 (2012)). 
14. Harter, supra note 11, at 476–77. 
15. Harter, supra note 5 (discussing Coglianese, supra note 5). 
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A. Classic Unfavorable Views of Regulatory Capture 
Classic views of regulatory capture consider the phenomenon to be 
normatively undesirable as disruptive of both democratic legitimacy16 
and institutional accountability in the administrative state.17 The term 
“regulatory capture” has been used broadly throughout administrative 
law literature.18 Some variations focus on the placement of sympathetic 
individuals in key positions within administrative agencies,19 while 
others focus on the ability of private parties to influence regulatory 
outcomes by exerting pressure through procedural aspects of 
administrative processes.20 Livermore and Revesz provide a perspective-
neutral description of the overarching category encompassing all these 
views, arguing that “capture can be understood to occur when organized 
groups successfully act to vindicate their interests through government 
policy at the expense of the public interest.”21 
This Article starts from the “expense of the public interest” viewpoint 
of regulatory capture. It then proposes a contrary position, arguing that 
in certain instances, private influence over administrative processes can 
be structured through legislation to harness private expertise not at the 
expense of the public interest, but rather in support of it. Thus, this 
Article considers procedural capture, whereby regulated entities and 
other private interests are able to use procedural authority, such as the 
threat of acting in a manner that will break down and invalidate or delay 
the administrative process, to achieve given outcomes contrary to the 
public interest. Most often this applies in the rulemaking context, such as 
in the case of negotiated rulemaking. Some scholars, however, describe 
examples in adjudicatory contexts as well.22 
16. Baxter, supra note 1. 
17. See Stigler, supra note 9.  
18. See Livermore & Revesz, supra note 9. 
19. Frédéric Boehm, Regulatory Capture Revisited—Lessons from Economics of Corruption 
(Internet Centre for Corruption Research, Working Paper No. 22, 2007), available at 
http://www.icgg.org/corruption.research.html. 
20. See id. 
21. Livermore & Revesz, supra note 9, at 1343. 
22. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and 
Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377 (2006); Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering 
Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 411, 429 (2000). 
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1. What is the “Public Interest?” 
Debate over what constitutes the “public interest” enjoys a rich 
history both in political theory and in political action. This Article does 
not engage in a debate as to what substantively constitutes the public 
interest. To the contrary, the hypothesis advanced in this Article suggests 
that the concept of the public interest need not be fully defined a priori 
the regulatory process. Rather, it proposes that under certain 
circumstances, discussed in Part III, the incentives of private parties 
involved in the regulatory process can be aligned such that those private 
parties’ goals are consistent with the hypothetical legislative process 
which purports to act in the public interest. This Article does not opine 
as to whether the legislative process in a representative republic such as 
the United States can, or whether the U.S. federal legislature actually 
does, act in such a fashion. Rather, it only takes the position that 
regulatory interests can be aligned to act similarly to a legislature, 
thereby increasing the legitimacy and efficacy of the regulatory process. 
Of course, being a process of regulation, the legislature will have 
provided some preliminary guidance as to subject matter and goals. This 
is precisely consistent with a concept of the public interest that is 
agnostic respecting the hypothesis of this Article—the assumption is that 
whatever guidance the legislature provides must be in the public interest, 
and whatever details and discretion are delegated to the administrative 
agency should operate consistent with that public interest. This Article 
proposes a hypothesis for improving the process by which the agency 
exercises that discretion and fills in the details. By structuring the 
process to function as a miniature or “proxy” legislature, the agency’s 
regulatory outcomes retain greater legitimacy while still fulfilling their 
task of engaging subject matter expertise and leveraging that portion of 
the expertise held by private entities. 
2. The Rise of Regulatory Capture and Adversarial Rulemaking 
Engaging private expertise does, however, carry substantial risk of 
regulatory capture.23 Effective engagement of private expertise requires 
more than just the traditional “notice and comment” informal 
23. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena I. Steinzor, Capture, Accountability, and Regulatory Metrics, 
86 TEX. L. REV. 1741 (2008); David J. Sousa & Christopher McGrory Klyza, New Directions in 
Environmental Policy Making: An Emerging Collaborative Regime or Reinventing Interest Group 
Liberalism?, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 377, 427 (2007); Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental 
Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81 (2002). 
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rulemaking process.24 As described in the Attorney General’s Manual on 
the Administrative Procedure Act, “an agency is free to formulate rules 
upon the basis of materials in its files and the knowledge and experience 
of the agency, in addition to the materials adduced in public rule making 
proceedings.”25 Many agencies have adopted this viewpoint, 
determining that they are free to ignore comments submitted during 
informal rulemaking proceedings and promulgate regulations based on 
their own expertise.26 Thus, to fully engage private expertise, agencies 
must either be subject to “capture” through the placement of sympathetic 
individuals in key positions within the agency,27 or the regulatory 
process must be structured in a way that incentivizes (or even compels) 
the agency to engage private expertise. 
As described by Professor Harter, “[b]eginning in the mid-1960s, 
regulatory procedure began its evolution toward [this] hybrid process.”28 
Both Congress29 and the courts30 played roles in expanding the use of 
hybrid rulemaking processes, which variously required more process and 
the development of greater factual material before an agency was 
permitted to promulgate a rule. This process progressed over several 
years, evolving agencies’ roles from what Harter described as “expert 
guardian[s] of the public interest”31 into “umpire[s] . . . reaching policy 
decisions as [a] result of adversar[ial] activity [among] competing 
[private interests].”32 Although this trend toward adversarial hybrid 
rulemaking was substantially mitigated by the Supreme Court’s decision 
24. Reiss, supra note 1, at 596.  
25. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT 31–32 (1947). 
26. Steven J. Balla, Between Commenting and Negotiation: The Contours of Public Participation 
in Agency Rulemaking, 1 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 59, 64 (2005). 
27. See Michael C. Nissim-Sabat, Capturing This Watchdog? The Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau Keeping the Special Interests Out of Its House, 40 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
As noted above, this type of capture generally is outside the scope of this Article, which focuses 
rather on procedural capture. 
28. Harter, supra note 3, at 10. 
29. Id. 
30. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that once a 
notice of proposed rulemaking is issued, all ex parte communications by agency officials or 
employees must be documented in the public file so that interested parties may comment on said 
contacts); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 483 F.2d 1238, 1252–54, 1262–64 (D.C. Cir. 
1973) (holding that rules setting minimum rates to be charged by natural gas pipeline owners were 
subject to more procedure than the minimal requirements of section 553 of the APA, but less than 
that required by sections 556 and 557). 
31. Harter, supra note 3, at 14. 
32. Id. at 14 n.73 (citing Williams, Fifty Years of the Law of Federal Administrative Agencies—
and Beyond, 29 FED. B.J. 267, 276 (1970)). 
 
                                                     
07 - Thaw Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2014  12:14 PM 
338 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:329 
in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.,33 courts at the time found other methods to constrain 
agencies34 and Congress’s ability to impose additional constraints of 
course remained unaffected. The result was a situation in the early 1980s 
that Harter described as “a crisis of legitimacy that [was] the [then] 
current malaise.”35 
Harter’s observations in 1980 were accurate. Scholars are split over 
whether the consensual regulatory responses, such as negotiated 
rulemaking, were ever effective in addressing the problems of the 
1980s.36 Regardless of which interpretation is correct, the contemporary 
regulatory process faces a similar challenge. The combination of 
political polarization,37 unprecedented investment in lobbying efforts to 
limit or expand regulatory authority,38 expansive political disagreement 
over regulatory capture in the financial industry and its role in the 
financial crisis beginning in 2008,39 and other similar challenges 
describe a regulatory environment highly maligned by “malaise” where 
33. See generally Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519 
(1978) (holding that courts could not impose additional procedural constraints on administrative 
agencies beyond those required under the APA or under the organic statute(s) applicable to the 
proceeding in question). 
34. See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass’n v. Reno, 57 F.3d 1129, 1132–33 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that 
“[n]otice of a proposed rule must include sufficient detail on its content and basis in law and 
evidence to allow for meaningful and informed comment” and that “[l]ikewise, in adopting the final 
rule, the agency must ‘articulate with reasonable clarity its reasons for decision, and identify the 
significance of the crucial facts’” (quoting Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 
(D.C. Cir. 1970))); Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 673 F.2d 525, 533 
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that final rules must be a “logical outgrowth” of proposed rules and 
failure to satisfy that requirement may foreclose useful participation and make the notice-and-
comment process defective).  
35. Harter, supra note 3, at 17. 
36. Cf. Coglianese, supra note 5; Harter, supra note 5. Coglianese analyzes the efficacy of 
negotiated rulemaking based on comparison of rulemaking time between negotiated rulemakings 
and ordinary notice-and-comment rulemakings, concluding that there is little difference in 
outcomes. Harter responds by suggesting that Coglianese’s empirical metrics are incorrect, and do 
not properly represent efficacy gains from negotiated rulemaking. 
37. James Moody & Peter J. Mucha, Portrait of Political Party Polarization, 1 NETWORK SCI. 
119 (2013). 
38. See, e.g., Post Passage Lobbying Statistics, AM. FOR FIN. REFORM (Aug. 2, 2013), 
http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/2010/08/post-passage-lobbying-statistics/; Wall Street Influence, by 
the Numbers, AM. FOR FIN. REFORM (May 14, 2010), http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/2010/05/wall-
street-influence-by-the-numbers/. 
39. See generally Patricia A. McCoy, Federal Preemption, Regulatory Failure and the Race to 
the Bottom in US Mortgage Lending Standards, in THE PANIC OF 2008, at 132 (Lawrence E. 
Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. eds., 2010); Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in 
Financial Regulation, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 327 (2013); Brett McDonnell, Don’t Panic! Defending 
Cowardly Interventions During and After A Financial Crisis, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
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at least some, if not most, parties feel disenfranchised by the process. 
3. Responses to Regulatory Capture 
In response to these regulatory shortcomings, Harter proposed a form 
of consensual rulemaking under which the regulated interests and the 
regulators would “negotiate” regarding a proposed rule before that rule 
was promulgated into the APA’s informal rulemaking process.40 His 
proposal responded to two trends in administrative law at the time: (1) 
methods to force agencies to improve the analytical bases for their 
decision-making; and (2) methods to provide interested parties an 
opportunity to participate in the development of rules by sharing in the 
decisions as to rulemaking, rather than adversarial participation as 
described in Part I.A.2 above.41 In adopting this latter method, Harter 
argued that both the legitimacy and the efficacy of the regulatory process 
could be improved.42 He laid out nine factors for determining when this 
consensual approach—which he called “Negotiating Regulations”—
would be appropriate to a given regulatory process: (1) countervailing 
power; (2) a limited number of parties; (3) that the issues of discussion 
were “mature” and “concrete”; (4) inevitability of the decision; (5) the 
opportunity for (parties to) gain; (6) the core issue does not turn on 
disputed “fundamental values”; (7) the issue allows for trade-offs in 
negotiation; (8) scientific research could not determine a dominant 
approach; and (9) the results of the negotiations would be likely to be 
implemented in the regulatory process.43 
Harter’s proposal generally involved the formation of a pre-
rulemaking advisory committee including staff from the administrative 
agency charged with regulatory authority. Before beginning a 
rulemaking proceeding, the committee would be convened and required 
to reach a consensus on a proposed regulation, which then would 
become the basis for the proposed rule and adopted into the agency’s 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking under the APA.44 Some agencies 
experimented with variations of this approach throughout the 1980s.45 In 
40. See generally Harter, supra note 11. 
41. Harter, supra note 3, at 27. 
42. See id. (“[This] response is an attempt to replicate at least part of the political process through 
advisory committees that tap a diversity of interests and that provide advice and guidance to the 
agency.”). 
43. Id. at 42–51. 
44. Id. at 115–18; see also id. at 57–102 (for more precise detail on Harter’s recommendations). 
45. Coglianese, supra note 5, at 1263 & n.34 (“In 1983, the Federal Aviation Administration 
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1990, Congress ultimately adopted Harter’s recommendation in the 
NRA,46 which formally was incorporated into the APA in 1996.47 
Agencies, however, rarely were required to employ negotiated 
rulemaking and few elected to adopt it voluntarily. Some scholars have 
argued that this failure of implementation results from a lack of efficacy 
at achieving either increased efficiency in rulemaking or increased 
perception of legitimacy about the regulatory process.48 In the Part that 
follows, I examine a series of negotiated rulemaking examples as 
backdrop to presenting the cybersecurity example I hold out as a model 
success of regulatory capture. 
B. Negotiated Rulemaking 
In Part I.A.3 above, I lay out the nine factors Philip Harter proposed 
for when negotiated rulemaking is appropriate. In this Part, I first discuss 
when and why agencies use negotiated rulemaking, and then proceed to 
examine three examples I characterize as successful and one I 
characterize as a failure.49 For each example, I evaluate the process 
according to Harter’s factors. I also review existing literature discussing 
these examples, and compare other scholars’ characterizations of these 
examples with how my analysis of Harter’s factors predicts whether they 
would be successful or not. The sum of this analysis lays a backdrop for 
Part II, in which I introduce cybersecurity as a successful example of 
consensual rulemaking using regulatory capture. Taken together, the 
analysis here and that in Part II form the basis for my recommendations 
(FAA) initiated the first formal negotiated rulemaking. A few other agencies followed the FAA in 
experimenting with the alternative procedure, most prominently the EPA. Although these early 
attempts at negotiation were generally considered valuable experiences, by 1990 only five federal 
agencies had promulgated rules using negotiated rulemaking . . . . The five agencies were the 
Department of Education, Department of Labor, Department of Transportation, Environmental 
Protection Agency, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Three other agencies—the Department of 
Agriculture, Department of Interior, and Federal Trade Commission—had initiated negotiated 
rulemaking proceedings but had yet to issue final rules following these negotiations.”). 
46. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570 (2012)). 
47. See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 11(a), 110 Stat. 
3870, 3873 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570). 
48. Coglianese, supra note 5, at 1277–78 (“It may well also be that skepticism on the part of 
agency staff partly explains why the use of negotiated rulemaking has made only a tiny dent in the 
overall regulatory activity of the federal government.”); see also id. at 1261 (“Despite all the 
postulations about how negotiated rulemaking will save time and eliminate litigation, the procedure 
so far has not proven itself superior to the informal rulemaking that agencies ordinarily use.”). 
49. Regulations pertaining to international rulemaking, such as by State Department agencies, and 
any agencies not subject to the APA, are outside the scope of discussion for this Article. 
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in Part III as to what factors predict when regulatory capture may be 
used to structure regulation in the public interest. 
1. The “Choice” to Use Negotiated Rulemaking 
In most cases, when agencies engage in the negotiated rulemaking 
process, it is an elective choice. As noted by Julia Kobick, the NRA 
“uses permissive rather than mandatory language”50 and allows agencies 
to “convene a negotiated rulemaking committee when ‘it is in the public 
interest.’”51 On occasion, an agency will be required to engage in 
negotiated rulemaking either by statute or by Executive Order, but such 
mandates are rare.52 
Once selected, negotiated rulemaking involves a series of pre-
rulemaking steps designed to engage certain interested parties in 
development of a draft rule that will be adopted as the agency’s official 
proposed rule in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking pursuant to the 
traditional information rulemaking requirements of the APA.53 These 
steps include: (1) publication of a notice that the agency will establish a 
negotiated rulemaking committee;54 (2) acceptance of applications for 
membership on the committee;55 (3) establishment of the committee;56 
(4) conduct of the committee’s business;57 (5) ongoing support of 
agency through the traditional rulemaking process (optional);58 and (6) 
termination of the committee.59 The Federal Advisory Committee Act 
(FACA) generally governs the activities of negotiated rulemaking 
50. Julia Kobick, Negotiated Rulemaking: The Next Step in Regulatory Innovation at the Food 
and Drug Administration, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 425, 428 (2010); id. at n.28 (“The plain language 
of the statute undermines the notion that the NRA’s procedures are mandatory.” (quoting Tex. 
Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 265 F.3d 313, 327 (5th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
51. Id. at 428 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 563 (2006)). 
52. Morriss, supra note 5, at 179 n.2 (citing 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 288 (3d ed. 1994)); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Eric W. 
Orts, Environmental Contracts in the United States, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS: 
COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO REGULATORY INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 
71, 73 (Eric W. Orts & Kurt Deketelaere eds., 2001) (“In any event, reg negs are relatively rare. 
They are required by statute in only a limited number of circumstances.” (citing Coglianese, supra 
note 5, at 1268 & n.75)).  
53. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
54. Id. § 564(a). 
55. Id. § 564(b). 
56. Id. § 565. 
57. Id. § 566. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. § 567. 
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committees unless otherwise specified by statute.60 
In the parts that follow, I trace and evaluate the use of negotiated 
rulemaking in specific cases. Existing scholarship divides on whether 
negotiated rulemaking has fulfilled its goals of increasing legitimacy and 
efficiency of the regulatory process.61 The following examples do not 
present a direct answer to that debate. Their purpose, rather, is to 
highlight the function of negotiated rulemaking. In Part II, I present by 
example an alternate capture-based theory for increasing regulatory 
legitimacy and efficacy, and in Part III, I apply that theory to these 
examples to compare how it will function in these cases as partial basis 
for my hypotheses abstracting general characteristics describing when 
that alternate capture theory may be effective. I categorize these 
examples into “successes” and “failures” solely to present a reasonable 
balance of qualitative examples. Empirical analysis to validate these 
hypotheses is appropriate for future work and will likely benefit from the 
ongoing work described by other scholars.62 
2. Negotiated Rulemaking “Successes” 
In analyzing the following examples as “successes,” I primarily 
consider whether the process resulted in a rule that was adopted as a 
result of the negotiations process and whether the interested parties 
generally viewed this process as efficient and legitimate.63 These 
examples were selected because of the relatively short number of 
meetings required to develop such a rule and the fact that the process 
demonstrated that the parties made substantial progress toward 
agreement on otherwise-contested issues. 
These examples also serve the purpose of providing a foil for my 
analysis in Part III. As canonical examples in the existing literature of 
60. See generally id. §§ 562–570a; Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 
§ 2(6), 104 Stat. 4969 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570). 
61. Cf. Coglianese, supra note 5; Harter, supra note 5. 
62. See Reiss, supra note 1, at 572 (noting that Professor Reiss currently has three empirical 
studies underway evaluating the potential benefits of certain aspects of regulatory capture). 
63. The primary focus here is whether the interested parties strongly objected on the basis of 
feeling disenfranchised by the process. The notice-and-comment process for these examples, and 
the scholarly literature analyzing them, suggests a degree of perceived legitimacy whereby 
interested parties felt that progress toward an acceptable regulation resulted from the negotiated 
rulemaking process and/or that they were able to express their views more effectively than through a 
traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking process. In contrast, consider the example discussed in 
Part I.B.3.a below, in which the scholarly literature characterizes interested parties to the 
Department of Education’s negotiated rulemaking process for implementing the No Child Left 
Behind Act as feeling as though the Department suppressed their viewpoints. 
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negotiated rulemaking successes, I examine them here as among the 
strongest challenges to my proposition in this Article that the healthcare 
cybersecurity example is unique and original and bears investigation 
outside its strict technological context. As I discuss in Part III, these 
examples can be differentiated and the processes adopted here do not 
share all the key characteristics I identify in the healthcare cybersecurity 
example. 
a. National Park Service—Cape Cod National Seashore Off-Road 
Vehicle Use 
The National Park Service (NPS) is responsible for “preserv[ing] and 
protect[ing]” natural resources designated as national park areas as well 
as enabling individuals to enjoy the present use of these areas and 
resources.64 The Cape Cod National Seashore is home to a variety of 
natural resources including avian species protected by the Endangered 
Species Act—which the NPS is charged with protecting.65 This region 
includes a corridor designated for the use of off-road vehicles, which can 
pose hazards to the lifecycle of endangered avian species in the area.66 
The NPS originally developed a plan to balance these competing 
interests and promulgated appropriate regulations in 1981, and those 
regulations as amended in 1985 survived judicial review in 1988 and 
1989.67 Changes in the regional environment and the population of the 
endangered avian species, however, frequently necessitated that NPS 
implement temporary measures substantially restricting use of the off-
road vehicle corridor.68 Based on the contentious history surrounding the 
corridor’s use, the NPS elected to engage a negotiated rulemaking 
process for the development of a new, updated rule governing the 
corridor’s use.69 
64. Cape Cod Nat’l Seashore; Off-Road Vehicle Use, 63 Fed. Reg. 9143, 9143 (Feb. 24, 1998) 
(codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 7 (2012)). 
65. Id. at 9143–44; see also Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2012) and scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.). 
66. Cape Cod Nat’l Seashore; Off-Road Vehicle Use, 63 Fed. Reg. at 9143–44. 
67. Id. at 9143. 
68. Id. at 9144 (noting that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, “during the time when the Seashore 
receives the most visitors (Fourth of July), including people wishing to use the ORV corridor, only 
0.4 to 0.6 miles of the corridor has been open”). 
69. Id. While the agency also cites (unspecified) “legislative requirements” as factoring into its 
decision to employ negotiated rulemaking, it appears from the available materials that the choice 
was not mandated by statute. Id. (“The need for a new rule and the use of negotiated process was 
motivated by a number of events including legislative requirements, past litigation, management 
issues and inflexibility of the existing rule to deal with changing conditions such as the use of the 
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In reporting its choice to use negotiated rulemaking, the NPS 
describes its objective as “front load[ing] the controversy by getting all 
the interested parties involved in the decision-making process from the 
beginning and acknowledging, if not resolving, all the issues and 
concerns.”70 The NPS did not describe how it selected the members of 
the committee; however, its choice of organizations (each of which were 
permitted one committee representative) suggests that it included local 
organizations most active respecting the corridor, organizations involved 
in prior litigation, organizations representing business interests (e.g., 
tourism), and appropriate federal and state agencies.71 The final 
committee comprised twenty-three members, and bore the goal of 
affording equal voices to each one of them.72 NPS attempted to achieve 
this through the well-known “consensus process” in negotiated 
rulemaking, under which each member of the committee had veto 
authority.73 
The committee’s responsibility was to develop a new proposed 
regulation for off-road vehicle use in the corridor. NPS committed that if 
consensus was reached, it would adopt the committee’s proposed 
regulation in its official proposed regulation to be promulgated through 
the ordinary rulemaking process.74 If the committee failed to reach 
consensus, however, NPS would proceed to develop a rule on its own. 
While NPS stated it would do so “using the ideas, information and 
creativity that had been gathered from the group,”75 there was no 
statutory requirement forcing it to do so nor was there any guarantee that 
such input would be usable in making a rule.76 Thus, a committee 
member with veto power could possibly use that power to force an issue. 
In this case, however, the committee was successful, and reached 
consensus rather quickly—in a total of three two-day meetings, spaced 
one month apart—resulting in a convening-to-proposal-rule time of 
corridor by the [endangered avian species].”). Most likely these “legislative requirements” refer to 
the “need for a new rule” and not to the “use of the negotiated process.” 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. For example, if the group failed to reach consensus because of irreconcilable and mutually 
exclusive positions on key points, those “ideas, information and creativity” may be useless to NPS 
beyond informing it of positions about which it likely already knew and almost certainly would 
receive formal comments about during the ordinary rulemaking process. 
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approximately sixty days.77 Based on the report on the committee’s 
activities by the Acting Assistant Secretary, it appears that the shared 
desire among the participants for a new rule that would improve on the 
current situation (a situation generally undesirable to all) strongly 
disincentivized the participants from exercising their veto power.78 
b. Implementation of the “No Child Left Behind Act” for Bureau of 
Indian Affairs-Funded Schools 
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) required that certain 
rules promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior affecting schools 
funded by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) be developed pursuant to a 
negotiated rulemaking process.79 The Act designated six substantive 
areas that were to be the subject of negotiated rulemaking procedures, 
one of which was the development of definitions for reporting 
“Adequate Yearly Progress” for BIA-funded schools.80 In this instance, 
the use of negotiated rulemaking was compulsory, pursuant to the 
statute.81 Congress required negotiated rulemaking given the potentially 
contentious issues involved with federal oversight of local schools and 
the widely varying interested parties, particularly in the case of BIA-
funded schools.82 
The Secretary of the Interior, pursuant to the requirements of the Act, 
convened a negotiated rulemaking committee to develop the regulations 
that would codify these definitions.83 The committee comprised nineteen 
representatives of tribal organizations and six representatives of federal 
agencies.84 All representatives of federal agencies were from within the 
Department of the Interior (DOI), and the Secretary (of the Interior) did 
not elect to seek assistance from the Department of Education (DOE) in 
77. Cape Cod Nat’l Seashore; Off-Road Vehicle Use, 63 Fed. Reg. at 9144. 
78. Id. Although “every organization had veto authority,” the members were aware that “if 
consensus was reached, the consensus regulation would be put forward as a proposed rule,” but “[i]f 
the committee was unable to reach consensus on a new regulation, then the NPS would develop a 
new rule.” Id. 
79. 25 U.S.C. § 2018(b) (2012); see also Implementation of the No Child Left Behind Act of 
2001, 70 Fed. Reg. 22,178, 22,178 (Apr. 28, 2005). 
80. See Implementation of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 70 Fed. Reg. at 22,178. 
81. 25 U.S.C. § 2018(b). 
82. Danielle Holley-Walker, The Importance of Negotiated Rulemaking to the No Child Left 
Behind Act, 85 NEB. L. REV. 1015, 1017 (2007). 
83. See Implementation of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 70 Fed. Reg. at 22,178; 
Proposed Membership of the Negotiated Rulemaking Committee Under Section 1138 of the No 
Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,631 (May 5, 2003). 
84. Implementation of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 70 Fed. Reg. at 22,178. 
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this regard.85 
The committee divided into four work groups to address the six 
substantive areas for which it was charged with developing regulations, 
with one such work group dedicated to the “adequate yearly progress” 
question.86 The committee met five times over a five-month period, with 
the work groups presenting recommendations to the full committee, and 
it operated with a consensus requirement (with all parties having veto 
power).87 The committee’s recommendation was adopted for publication 
as a proposed rule, and the committee also handled responses to public 
comments—including resulting modifications to the final rule—during 
the traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking period.88 
Like the Cape Cod National Seashore example above, the consensus 
requirement in this case could allow a committee member to force (or 
more likely prevent) a particular resolution of an issue. The statutory 
mandate, however, that negotiated rulemaking be used in this case, 
changes the incentives for committee members. The Act had separate 
provisions for rules promulgated by the DOE and for rules promulgated 
by the DOI. The provisions applicable to the Secretary of Education 
permitted rulemaking outside negotiated rulemaking if that process 
failed,89 whereas the provisions applying to the Secretary of the Interior 
did not have such an exemption.90 Additionally, while negotiated 
rulemaking under the NCLB by the DOE was exempt from the FACA,91 
negotiated rulemaking under the NCLB by the DOI was not exempt 
from the FACA, a distinction I discuss further below.92 
These differences may suggest why, as discussed further in Part 
I.B.3.a below, the negotiated rulemaking mandate of the NCLB has been 
85. Id. The Act suggests, but does not require, that the Secretary of the Interior consult with the 
Secretary of Education on the development of these definitions and/or the provision of other 
“technical assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 6316(g)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (“The Secretary of the Interior, in 
consultation with the Secretary [of Education] if the Secretary of Interior requests the 
consultation . . . shall define adequate yearly progress . . . .”); id. § 6316(g)(1)(C) (“The Secretary of 
Interior shall, in consultation with the Secretary [of Education] if the Secretary of Interior requests 
the consultation, either directly or through a contract, provide technical assistance, upon request, to 
a tribal governing body or school board of a school funded by the Bureau of Indian Affairs that 
seeks to develop an alternative definition of adequate yearly progress.”). 
86. Implementation of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 70 Fed. Reg. at 22,178. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 22,178–79. 
89. See 20 U.S.C. § 6572(a) (2012). 
90. See 25 U.S.C. § 2018 (2012). 
91. 20 U.S.C. § 6571(b)(4)(B). 
92. 25 U.S.C. § 2018(b)(3)(E). 
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characterized as a failure.93 It combined the additional openness required 
under the FACA, the DOI’s choice not to include the DOE,94 and the 
inability of the DOI to promulgate rules outside the negotiated 
rulemaking mandate. The result likely increased at least the perceived 
authority (if not also the actual authority) of the members of the 
committee and thus contributed to its increased perceived legitimacy and 
success. 
c. Federal Aviation Administration Flight and Duty Time Rules 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) promulgated rules in the 
1950s addressing limits on active service for aircrews before rest periods 
were required.95 Although aviation technology and use expanded 
substantially over the following thirty years, the FAA failed to 
promulgate new rules by the early 1980s in large part due to substantial 
opposition from nearly all interested parties during the traditional notice-
and-comment rulemaking process.96 As a result, the Administration 
elected to try a negotiated rulemaking procedure in 1983.97 Unlike the 
other examples discussed in this Part, this election was prior to passage 
of the NRA, and was therefore both completely voluntary on the part of 
the agency and followed the recommendations of Philip Harter and the 
Administrative Conference of the United States.98 
Notwithstanding this notable difference, the process employed by the 
FAA in 1983 remarkably parallels that used in post-NRA rulemakings.99 
The FAA issued a notice in the Federal Register of its intent to employ a 
negotiated rulemaking process,100 provided notice of what parties were 
preselected to and what procedures would apply to become part of the 
committee, and details of the issues to be considered by the 
93. See generally Holley-Walker, supra note 82. 
94. See id. at 1018; infra Part I.B.3.a (discussing how Holley-Walker proposes that the DOE’s 
influence over the negotiated rulemaking process resulted in non-DOE officials lacking meaningful 
participation in the rulemaking process for areas of NCLB other than BIA-funded schools). 
95. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation of 
Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 GEO. L.J. 1625, 1667–
68 (1986). 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 1667. 
98. See Harter, supra note 3, at 52–102. 
99. This similarity likely is due to the fact that Harter’s recommendations were substantially 
adopted in the final version of the NRA. 
100. At that time this was referred to as “regulatory negotiation,” a term-of-art proposed by 
Harter that became the basis for the colloquial term “reg-neg” often used when referring to 
negotiated rulemaking. 
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committee.101 The FAA agreed to promulgate any (otherwise-
permissible) rule reached by committee consensus through the 
traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking process.102 Additionally, out 
of concern for misuse of the negotiated rulemaking process to delay 
rulemaking, the FAA placed limits on the duration of the committee’s 
activities and indicated it would proceed with its own rulemaking if the 
negotiated rulemaking process failed to reach consensus.103 In essence, 
the agency was transferring a degree of structural regulatory capture to 
the parties as an incentive for them to participate in a consensual 
process. 
The committee comprised the FAA and sixteen aviation industry 
organizations and operators.104 The committee held sixteen formal 
meetings and more than thirty informal meetings over a period of 
approximately three months in 1983.105 While the committee failed to 
reach consensus on exact regulations, it did “succeed[] in narrowing the 
differences among parties and in reaching substantial agreement on 
some issues.”106 The FAA thus viewed the process as a success, and 
produced a proposed rule based on these deliberations. It promulgated 
the rule through the traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking process, 
in which the committee was also given the opportunity to participate.107 
3. Negotiated Rulemaking “Failures” 
These examples serve two purposes. First, they provide contrast to the 
successful examples identified above for the purpose of later analysis 
when I compare negotiated rulemaking to the healthcare cybersecurity 
example. Second, examining failures of negotiated rulemaking also 
provides some insight into conditions when the engagement of private 
interests for public ends may be inappropriate. I use these insights in 
Part III to suggest conditions under which regulatory capture may be 
used to harness private expertise for public goals. 
These examples were selected based on a combination of scholarly 
consensus that they were failures, perception by the interested parties of 
101. Perritt, supra note 95, at 1668–69. 
102. Id. at 1668. 
103. Id. 
104. Flight Time, Duty Time, and Rest Requirements for Flight Crewmembers Utilized by Air 
Carriers, 48 Fed. Reg. 29,771, 29,772 (Jun. 28, 1983). 
105. Perritt, supra note 95, at 1670. 
106. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
107. Id. at 1671. 
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a lack of efficiency or legitimacy,108 or a failure of the process to 
generate or substantially contribute to an adopted regulation. 
a. Implementation of Other Provisions of the “No Child Left Behind 
Act” 
As discussed above in Part I.B.2.b, some administrative law 
scholarship characterizes the NCLB as a failure of negotiated 
rulemaking.109 The NCLB provisions discussed above as successes were 
specific to rulemakings by the Department of the Interior that applied to 
BIA-funded schools. As noted in that Subpart, key provisions of the 
NCLB’s negotiated rulemaking requirements differ between DOI 
rulemakings and DOE rulemakings. 
The DOE generally is responsible for rulemaking pertaining to all 
schools other than those funded by the BIA. As noted above, the DOE 
mandate differs in two key respects: first, the DOE has the authority to 
promulgate regulations that may contrast with the results of the 
negotiated rulemaking process if the process is unsuccessful or upon 
proper justification;110 and second, the DOE’s negotiated rulemaking 
procedures are not subject to the FACA.111 
Danielle Holley-Walker argues that the DOE’s use of negotiated 
rulemaking in satisfying the NCLB requirements failed in nearly all the 
respects I consider in this Part.112 She describes that while it “offers the 
promise of collaboration between the DOE, state education officials, 
[and other interested parties] . . . to achieve the goals of NCLB,” it failed 
because “[i]nstead, the voices of the non-DOE [participants were] 
ignored during the negotiated rulemaking process.”113 The most 
prominent failure related to legitimacy—resulting from inadequate 
representation of interested parties. Of the twenty-two people selected 
for the DOE’s negotiated rulemaking committee, for example, seven 
were designated “student representatives”; however, of those seven, five 
were school or state employees.114 She notes that while the NCLB does 
not require equal representation, the legislative history does note that 
“the DOE should achieve an ‘equitable balance between representatives 
108. See supra note 63. 
109. See generally Holley-Walker, supra note 82. 
110. See supra note 89. 
111. See supra note 91. 
112. See generally Holley-Walker, supra note 82. 
113. Id. at 1018. 
114. Id. at 1046 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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of parents and students and representatives of educators and education 
officials’ to insure ‘that the views of both program beneficiaries and 
program providers are fairly heard and considered.’”115 She cites several 
examples to support the position that the DOE’s actions were deliberate, 
including purposefully inviting the subsequent litigation filed by 
disenfranchised parties over the composition of the negotiated 
rulemaking committee.116 
The reasoning behind the DOE’s actions is not apparent from the 
evidence available; however, Holley-Walker’s analysis concludes that 
the structure of the negotiated rulemaking process—specifically the 
consensus requirement—creates structural incentives for the DOE to 
reduce the number of divergent viewpoints to increase the efficiency of 
its regulatory process.117 This analysis bears merit, and further suggests 
the ironic conclusion, discussed in greater detail in Part III, that the 
regulatory capture element is a key element in legitimizing the 
negotiated rulemaking committee. There is no evidence the DOE 
experienced greater structural incentives for efficient rulemaking than 
the DOI. By contrast, education is not the core competency of either the 
DOI or the BIA, and thus (if anything) the agency would face incentives 
to rapidly conclude this diversion so it could return to fulfilling its core 
objectives. As described above, however, the DOI lacked the flexibility 
to diverge from the negotiated rulemaking process that the DOE 
possessed.118 Furthermore, as also noted above, unlike the DOI, the DOE 
was not subject to the constraints of the FACA119 which, among other 
things, require it to afford greater consideration to requests for 
membership on the committee and provide greater transparency of the 
committee’s actions.120 Had the participants in the DOE negotiated 
rulemaking been afforded a greater degree of regulatory capture, as was 
the case in the DOI example, the DOE might have been more hesitant to 
so readily disenfranchise them. The fact that a lawsuit relating to the 
DOE’s selection of the negotiated rulemaking committee failed to 
survive the DOE’s motion to dismiss121 further supports this conclusion. 
115. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 107-334, at 809 (2001)) (emphasis omitted). 
116. Id. at 1046–53. 
117. Id. at 1048. 
118. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
119. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
120. See Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16 (2012)); infra Part II.A.2. 
121. See Holley-Walker, supra note 82, at 1048. 
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II. CYBERSECURITY REGULATION: A CURIOUS COUNTER-
EXAMPLE 
Part I discusses how existing administrative law scholarship generally 
views regulatory capture negatively. While negotiated rulemaking has 
produced some successes since its inception, at best the literature is 
mixed on its efficacy and, as described in Part I.B.3, there have been 
notable failures. Negotiated rulemaking developed in part as a response 
to social or cultural capture122 stemming from dissatisfaction with 
agency action at the time.123 Ironically, it experienced notable failures in 
circumstances when the agency employing it failed to yield sufficient 
control to the interested parties in negotiations. Regrettably, 
notwithstanding Harter’s suggestions,124 agencies or their enabling 
statutes, or both, often fail to accomplish this goal and leave agencies 
with too much control over the process.125 Negotiated rulemaking may 
have promise when implemented properly, but its current structure alone 
appears insufficient. 
Nonetheless, in recent years several scholars have suggested—
contrary to classic scholarship—that regulatory capture may be used in 
ways beneficial to the public good.126 This work is an important step 
forward in understanding how to engage private expertise to serve the 
two core goals discussed in this paper: efficacy and legitimacy. As noted 
by Reiss, however, there is a dearth of empirical data presenting 
examples of regulatory capture working in the public interest.127 
This Part presents, to the author’s knowledge, the first verifiable 
example discussed in scholarly literature of legislatively encoded 
regulatory capture functioning clearly in the public interest.128 When 
122. See James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING REGULATORY 
CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 71 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. 
Moss eds., 2013), available at http://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/ 
Kwak%20Cultural%20Capture%20%281.16.13%29.pdf; Baxter, supra note 1, at 183–84. 
123. See supra Part I.A.2–3. 
124. See Harter, supra note 3, at 44–51. 
125. See, e.g., Holley-Walker, supra note 82, at 1045–47. 
126. See generally Baxter, supra note 1; Reiss, supra note 1. 
127. See Reiss, supra note 1, at 572. 
128. Verification of the success of regulatory capture at representing the public interest in this 
example derives from two critical points. First, a regulation did result from the “captured” 
committee’s (NCVHS’s) activities, and that committee handled nearly all substantive aspects of the 
rulemaking, as discussed in Part II.A.3. Second, and most critically, the promulgated regulation 
resulted in healthcare entities being nearly four times more effective at preventing data breaches of 
consumers’ Protected Health Information than in other industries subject to data breach notification 
regimes alone. See Thaw, supra note 7, at 58. 
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Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
of 1996 (HIPAA), it included an information security requirement for 
entities managing individuals’ sensitive health data.129 The rulemaking 
authority for that requirement, which ultimately resulted in the HIPAA 
Security Rule,130 delegated substantial authority to the National 
Committee on Vital Health Statistics (NCVHS),131 a FACA committee 
composed entirely of representatives of private interests and private 
experts.132 
NCVHS, while having substantial statutory capture authority, 
nevertheless acted neither in the private interests of its membership nor 
in a least-common-denominator fashion that often plagued negotiated 
rulemaking committees.133 Rather, in a fashion rarely seen even in 
negotiated rulemaking, the committee members brought all their private 
expertise to the table—and checked their private agendas at the door. 
This Part explores why this virtually unheard-of circumstance 
occurred, suggesting two primary causes: (1) the unique structure of the 
enabling statute’s language encoding regulatory capture; and (2) the 
longstanding nature and developed trust in the FACA committee to 
which regulatory capture was committed by statute. It proceeds first by 
outlining and discussing the enabling statute, the Committee, and the 
process by which the HIPAA Security Rule was developed. It then 
examines the possible causes for private actors developing cybersecurity 
rules in the public interest, rather than in their own. Finally, it considers 
whether this is a circumstance unique to cybersecurity, concluding that it 
is at least present in some other industrial sectors, the application to 
which I proceed to examine in Part III. 
129. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
sec. 262(a), § 1173(d), 110 Stat. 1936, 2025–26 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d) 
(2006)). 
130. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302–.318 (2007). 
131. HIPAA secs. 262(a), 264(d), § 1172(f), 110 Stat. at 2024, 2034 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1, 1320d-2 note) (mandating that the Secretary “consult with” and “rely on the 
recommendations of the National Committee on Vital Health Statistics” in promulgating regulations 
respecting the privacy and security of health information). 
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 242k(k)(2); HIPAA sec. 263, § 306(k), 110 Stat. at 2031 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 242k(k)(2)); Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), Pub. L. No. 92-
463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16 (2012)). 
133. Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 
386, 441 (2001) (“A recent study of negotiated rulemaking conducted by Charles Caldart and 
Nicholas Ashford shows that in industries that are not likely to innovate in the absence of strong 
governmental regulation, the lowest-common-denominator problem keeps negotiated rules from 
promoting the technological innovation needed to improve environmental and safety 
performance.”). 
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A. HIPAA: An Experiment in Negotiated Rulemaking Alternatives 
When HIPAA was passed, Congress had decided it wanted to address 
the privacy of individuals’ health information, but had not yet reached 
agreement on any specifics.134 The Act had many other important 
provisions, including requirements for security standards, so instead of 
delaying its adoption, Congress added a provision to the law that if they 
failed to revisit the privacy question within thirty-six months, the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) would be directed to 
promulgate regulations135 consistent with basic “broad stroke” 
aspirational goals laid out in the Act.136 This direction to HHS also 
contained the capture-like consultation requirement discussed above.137 
The provisions of the Act granting HHS immediate authority to 
promulgate regulations governing the security of health information 
were subject to a similar capture-like consultation requirement.138 
1. Statutory Framework 
HIPAA provided general authority to the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services to adopt information security standards respecting the 
transmission and maintenance of health information by health 
(insurance) plans, healthcare clearinghouses, and healthcare providers 
who transmit health information electronically.139 It further provided, as 
noted above, that if Congress failed to revisit the issue of privacy 
134. “Congress couldn’t agree on the specifics, and they wrote a little sentence into the law that 
said if they couldn’t get it done in three years the Secretary of HHS ought to do it.” Donna E. 
Shalala, former Secretary of Health and Human Services, The Twenty-Seventh Charles L. Decker 
Lecture in Leadership (Apr. 28, 2008), in 197 MIL. L. REV. 145, 159 (2008). 
135. “If legislation governing standards with respect to the privacy of individually identifiable 
health information . . . is not enacted by the date that is 36 months after the date of the enactment of 
this Act [(Aug. 21, 1996)], the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall promulgate final 
regulations containing such standards . . . .” HIPAA § 264(c)(1), 110 Stat. at 2033. 
136. HIPAA sec. 262(a), § 1173(d), 110 Stat. at 2025–26 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1320d-2(d)) (listing the major goals of ensuring integrity and confidentiality of information and 
protecting against reasonably anticipated threats and unauthorized uses). 
137. “In carrying out this section, the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall consult 
with . . . the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics . . . .” HIPAA § 264(d), 110 Stat. at 
2034. 
138. “In complying with the requirements of this part [to develop security standards], the 
Secretary shall rely on the recommendations of the National Committee on Vital and Health 
Statistics . . . [and] shall publish in the Federal Register any recommendation of [the Committee] 
regarding the adoption of a standard under this part.” HIPAA sec. 262(a), § 1172(f), 110 Stat. at 
2024 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1). 
139. See HIPAA sec. 262(a), § 1173(d), 110 Stat. at 2025–26 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1320d-2(d)). 
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protections for health information within thirty-six months, the Secretary 
would be directed to promulgate regulations no later than forty-two 
months after HIPAA was enacted.140 Additionally, the Secretary was 
required within twelve months of HIPAA’s enactment to submit a report 
to Congress containing “detailed recommendations on standards with 
respect to the privacy of individually identifiable health information.”141 
Privacy and security are often viewed as separate regulatory 
questions, and sometimes even as being in tension with one another. 
While this separation was technically true in the case of HIPAA—the 
authority described above resulted in a Privacy Rule142 and a Security 
Rule143—the examination of the authority for both bears merit for two 
reasons. First, the statutory command for both is substantially similar 
(which I discuss in further detail below),144 and second, security and 
privacy are inextricably linked. Many colloquial views of privacy and 
security place them in tension—for example, the recent debates over 
government surveillance programs145 and long-standing disagreement 
over airport security measures146 frame privacy and security as 
opponents in a zero-sum game. 
This approach mischaracterizes the relationship between privacy and 
security. As noted by Derek Bambauer, privacy is a normative exercise 
in making “decisions about competing claims to legitimate access to, use 
of, and alteration of information.”147 Security, by contrast, is an 
objective exercise that “implements those choices . . . mediat[ing] 
between information and [normative] privacy selections” about the use 
of/access to that information.148 The fact that security implements 
140. See id. § 264(c)(1), 110 Stat. at 2033 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 note). 
141. Id. § 264(a), 110 Stat. at 2033 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 note). 
142. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160–164 (2007); see also HIPAA § 264, 110 Stat. at 2033–34 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 note). 
143. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302–.318 (2007); see also HIPAA sec. 262(a), § 1173(d), 110 Stat. at 
2025–26 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d)). 
144. Cf. HIPAA § 264, 110 Stat. at 2033–34 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 note); HIPAA sec. 
262(a), § 1172(f) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1(f)). Section 1172(f) applies to HIPAA section 
1173(d) (which is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d)) per the specifications of HIPAA section 
1172(c)(3)(A)(ii) (which is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1(c)(3)(A)(ii)). 
145. Robert Barnes, Timothy B. Lee & Ellen Nakashima, Government Surveillance Programs 
Renew Debate About Oversight, WASH. POST (June 8, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/ 
2013-06-08/politics/39834570_1_oversight-programs-government-surveillance. 
146. Kip Hawley, Why Airport Security Is Broken—and How to Fix It, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 15, 
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303815404577335783535660546.html. 
147. Derek E. Bambauer, Privacy Versus Security, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 667, 667–68 
(2013). 
148. Id. 
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privacy is a critical point often lost in legal (and other) scholarship and 
policy debate, but one important to the context of this paper. 
Specifically, it explains why consideration of the legislative authority 
under which HHS promulgated the Security Rule and the Privacy Rule 
should be considered together, and why both aspects of the rulemaking 
process are relevant. While this Article focuses on the Security Rule, the 
statutory authority under HIPAA and the timeline under which HHS 
acted consider the implication of both privacy and security. 
Additionally, the importance of this relationship was not lost on the 
members of the NCVHS: 
The security and privacy [sic] are very closely linked. The 
security is what enables privacy to be implemented and 
enforced. The security scope is larger in that it addresses not just 
confidentiality of data, but the standards also address integrity 
and availability of data, is the data there when you need it, is the 
data correct or have we made sure that it can’t be 
inappropriately altered. Those are things that are outside of the 
scope of the privacy provisions. But the privacy scope is larger 
because it addresses paper and oral protected health information 
and security is only looking at electronic.149 
Both the language in HIPAA providing authority for the Security 
Rule and the language providing authority for the Privacy Rule (if 
Congress failed to act, which was the case) had consultation 
requirements for the promulgation of those rules. These requirements 
included the pre-rulemaking engagement of a committee150 comprising 
private interests and subject matter experts outside the Department—but, 
curiously, not only failing to engage the negotiated rulemaking statute 
but likely excluding the possibility of its application. The language 
applicable to the Security Rule was: 
In complying with the requirements of this part [which includes 
§ 1173(d)], the Secretary shall rely on the recommendations of 
the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics 
established under section 306(k) of the Public Health Service 
Act (42 U.S.C. [§] 242k(k)), and shall consult with appropriate 
Federal and State agencies and private organizations. The 
149. Statement of Karen Trudel, Staff to the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics 
Subcommittee on Standards and Security, Transcript of the Full Committee Meeting of the National 
Committee on Vital and Health Statistics (Feb. 26, 2003), available at 
http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/030226tr.htm. 
150. See 42 U.S.C. § 242k(k) (2006) (describing the National Committee on Vital Health 
Statistics); infra Part II.A.2. 
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Secretary shall publish in the Federal Register any 
recommendation of the National Committee on Vital and Health 
Statistics regarding the adoption of a standard under this part.151 
In Part II.A.2 below, I discuss the NCVHS in greater detail. It is 
sufficient to note for this analysis that the NCVHS comprised entirely 
private individuals, and the only federal regulators on the Committee—
unlike in negotiated rulemaking committees—were assigned “staff to the 
committee.”152 This distinction is particularly important in light of the 
emphasized language above—the Secretary was required to rely on the 
Committee’s recommendations, and doing otherwise would likely result 
in an invalid rulemaking. This language provides substantial regulatory 
capture to a committee whose voting membership comprises entirely 
private individuals. Additionally, the statutory language requires further 
consultation with “private organizations.” While affording a lesser 
degree of capture to non-NCVHS members, this statutory consultation 
requirement is a far higher threshold than that afforded interested parties 
during a traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking. Additionally, the 
requirement that any recommendation put forth by the NCVHS be 
published in the Federal Register (as a recommendation) supports the 
proposition that the Committee has capture authority in that its proposals 
must be published in a fashion similar to Proposed Rules. Finally, it 
appears from the Committee’s transcripts that the members treated their 
authority in this manner.153 
151. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
sec. 262(a), § 1172(f), 110 Stat. 1936, 2024 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1(f)) 
(emphasis added). 
152. 42 U.S.C. § 242k(k)(2) (“The members of the Committee shall be appointed from among 
persons who have distinguished themselves in the fields of health statistics, electronic interchange 
of health care information, privacy and security of electronic information, population-based public 
health, purchasing or financing health care services, integrated computerized health information 
systems, health services research, consumer interests in health information, health data standards, 
epidemiology, and the provision of health services.”); see also Nat’l Comm. on Vital and Health 
Statistics, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Charter (Jan. 7, 2000) [hereinafter NCVHS Charter], 
available at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/charter10.pdf. 
153. Note the repeated reference by the presenting NCVHS member to the Committee acting as a 
legislative body. While he did not necessarily have legal training (and in fact most members did 
not), their perspective on this process in the following quote clearly evinces a belief that the 
Committee had effective authority over what regulation ultimately would result: 
The committee calls on everyone to work together on this in good faith . . . . The probability 
candidly that we can pass a law that will be perfect is very unlikely. I think the issue is, can we 
in fact pass solid legislation that will at least get us benchmarked and on the right 
track . . . . None of these benefits will be achieved unless everyone approaches the legislative 
process with a spirit of compromise. 
Don Detmer, Acting Chairman of NCVHS, Remarks at Public Forum: Role of the National 
Committee on Vital Health Statistics (July 9, 1997) (emphasis added), available at 
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Although somewhat less strong than the language directly referencing 
the enabling authority for the Security Rule, a similar application of the 
consultation requirement was applicable to the Privacy Rule: 
CONSULTATION. In carrying out this section, the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services shall consult with (1) the National 
Committee on Vital and Health Statistics established under 
section 306(k) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 
[§] 242k(k)); and the Attorney General.154 
This application further emphasizes the degree to which regulatory 
capture was encoded into the statutory design and the authority placed 
by Congressional directive in the hands of private individuals. 
2. The National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics 
The NCVHS was established by the Public Health Service Act155 to 
advise and assist the Secretary of Health and Human Services on a 
variety of policymaking issues.156 The Full Committee comprises 
eighteen members, sixteen of which are appointed by the Secretary, one 
of which is appointed by the Speaker of the House after consultation 
with the House Minority Leader, and one of which is appointed by the 
President pro tempore of the Senate after consultation with the Senate 
Minority Leader.157 The members of the Committee are experts who 
have distinguished themselves in various areas related to healthcare 
provision, statistics, healthcare information systems (specifically 
including privacy and security), consumer interests in healthcare, and 
other related areas.158 The NCVHS Charter contemplates the possibility 
that federal employees may be members of the Committee.159 Since 
1996, however, the membership overwhelmingly comprised 
representatives of private industry, with additional members who were 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/jul9t3.htm. 
154. HIPAA § 264(d), 110 Stat. at 2033 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 note) 
(applying this consultation requirement to the regulatory authority afforded HHS in section 264(c) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 note § (c))) (emphasis added). 
155. Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 78-410, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
156. 42 U.S.C. § 242k(k)(5). 
157. Id. § 242k(k)(3). 
158. See id. § 242k(k)(2). 
159. See NCVHS Charter, supra note 152, at 4 (“Members who are not full-time Federal 
employees shall be paid at a rate not to exceed the daily equivalent of the rate in effect for an 
Executive Level IV of the Executive Schedule for each day they are engaged in the performance of 
their duties as members of the Committee.” (emphasis added)). 
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leading experts (usually academics) and limited representation of State 
agencies.160 
The Committee’s primary function is to advise the Secretary and the 
Department on a variety of matters. This specifically includes 
“[s]tudy[ing] and identify[ing] privacy, security, and access measures to 
protect individually identifiable health information in an environment of 
electronic networking and multiple uses of data.”161 The Committee also 
comprises several subcommittees, which are designated to focus on 
specific issues. The modern NCVHS has a Subcommittee on Privacy, 
Confidentiality, and Security, which advises the Secretary on issues 
related to the Privacy Rule and the Security Rule.162 When HIPAA was 
enacted in 1996, however, the Subcommittee on Standards and 
Security163 had responsibility for the Security Rule, but not the Privacy 
Rule.164 
In addition to the statutory requirements in HIPAA requiring 
publication of the Committee’s activities respecting information 
security, the NCVHS is subject to the FACA.165 The FACA requires 
certain standardized procedures for federal advisory committees, 
160. NCVHS Calendar of Meetings, NAT’L COMMITTEE ON VITAL AND HEALTH STAT., DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/calendat.htm (last updated Apr. 10, 2014) 
(membership as listed in chronological meeting minutes). 
161. NCVHS Charter, supra note 152, at 2. 
162. Nat’l Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Charge of the 
Subcommittee on Privacy, Confidentiality and Security (Dec. 2008) [hereinafter Charge of the 
Subcommittee on Privacy, Confidentiality and Security], available at 
http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/privchrg.htm. 
163. Prior to June 1998, this subcommittee was known as the Subcommittee on Health Data 
Needs, Standards and Security. Following a committee-wide restructuring on June 16, 1998, the 
subcommittee was renamed the Subcommittee on Standards and Security. Nat’l Comm. on Vital 
and Health Statistics, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Transcript of the Full Committee Meeting 
of NCVHS (June 16, 1998), available at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/980616tr.htm. 
164. The Subcommittee on Standards and Security was renamed as the Subcommittee on 
Standards, and “Security” transferred to the Subcommittee on Privacy, Confidentiality, and Security 
in 2008. Compare Nat’l Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Meeting Minutes (Sept. 16–17, 2008), available at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/080916ag.htm 
(referring to the “Subcommittee on Standards and Security”), with Nat’l Comm. on Vital and Health 
Statistics, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Meeting Minutes (Oct. 14–15, 2008), available at 
http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/081014ag.htm (referring to the “Subcommittee on Standards”), and 
Charge of the Subcommittee on Privacy, Confidentiality and Security, supra note 162, and Nat’l 
Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Charge of the 
Subcommittee on Standards (Dec. 2008) [hereinafter Charge of the Subcommittee on Standards], 
available at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/stdschrg.htm. 
165. Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified 
as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16 (2012)); NCVHS Charter, supra note 152, at 1 (“The 
Committee is governed by provisions of Public Law 92-463 . . . which sets forth standards for the 
formation and use of advisory committees.”). 
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including the creation of a formal charter governing the committee’s 
activities, that committee meetings be open with opportunity for public 
participation, that detailed minutes and transcripts are kept and made 
available for public inspection, and other requirements designed to 
facilitate public participation and provide democratic legitimacy to such 
committees.166 
The Committee (and to the extent they acted formally, the 
subcommittees) had a notably different voting procedure than did 
negotiated rulemaking committees. Although the FACA does not 
prescribe a specific voting procedure for committee action, the NCVHS 
operated by majority vote—not by required consensus.167 While they 
strove for consensus, one or a few parties could not hold the process 
hostage to a threat of breaking consensus.168 Additionally, only fifty-one 
percent of the membership was required for quorum.169 This lack of 
mandatory consensus is one key factor that contributed to the continued 
success, described below, of the NCVHS in providing regulatory 
assistance to HHS. Unlike negotiated rulemaking, where members could 
have “internal” capture over the committee,170 NCVHS members could 
not as easily advance their own private viewpoints because they lacked 
the procedural ability to unilaterally derail committee progress. 
The NCVHS is one of the longest-operating federal advisory 
committees, originally formed in the 1950s and pre-dating FACA.171 
Membership is generally looked upon as an honor within the healthcare 
field, and members take their duties very seriously. These factors, 
166. See generally FACA, Pub. L. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770. 
167. See Nat’l Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Transcript 
of the Full Committee Meeting of NCVHS (June 21, 2007), available at 
http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/070621tr.htm (completing a voting procedure by majority show of 
hands). 
168. Nat’l Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Meeting 
Minutes of the Full Committee Meeting of NCVHS (Sept. 8–9, 1997), available at 
http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/970908am.htm (noting that Bob Gelman intended to submit a dissenting 
document to the Secretary of HHS on behalf of those who did not support the recommendations of 
the Subcommittee on Health Data Needs, Standards and Security). 
169. See Nat’l Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Transcript 
of the Full Committee Meeting of NCVHS (Feb. 10, 2011), available at 
http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/110210tr.htm (discussing the fact that the committee of eighteen must 
have a quorum of ten or more for the vote to pass). 
170. See generally supra Part I.B. 
171. NAT’L COMM. ON VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
NCVHS AT FIFTY: A BRIEF HISTORY AND HIGHLIGHTS (2000) [hereinafter NCVHS AT FIFTY], 
available at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/ncvhsat50.htm (“The National Committee on Vital and 
Health Statistics is one of the oldest and most prestigious advisory groups serving the Department of 
Health and Human Services.”). 
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combined with the effective regulatory capture described above and the 
FACA openness requirements contribute to the effectiveness of the 
NCVHS focusing on advancing public interest goals over the private 
interests represented by a majority of its members. Among the factors 
listed here, the longstanding nature of NCVHS and the degrees both of 
autonomy and legitimacy it is afforded by and within HHS appear most 
prevalent to its success at advancing public interest goals. 
3. Creation of the HIPAA Security Rule 
HIPAA granted HHS authority to promulgate information security 
regulations governing the transmission and maintenance of health 
information by covered entities, and contingent authority to promulgate 
related privacy regulations should Congress fail to revisit the issue 
within a specified time period.172 While now considered substantially 
interrelated issues, at the time the separation of the regulatory authority 
and the structure of the NCVHS led HHS to begin moving on the 
Security Rule shortly after HIPAA’s adoption. 
HIPAA was enacted on August 21, 1996. The NCVHS Subcommittee 
on Standards and Security (S&S) began work the following January to 
investigate the issues surrounding the rules they were required advise on 
pursuant to HIPAA’s consultation requirement.173 At the time, the S&S 
subcommittee comprised seven individuals, three of whom were 
independent experts174 and four of whom represented private industry.175 
From January through September 1997, the S&S subcommittee met and 
held hearings on the adoption of security standards consistent with the 
requirements of HIPAA section 1173(d).176 In September 1998, the S&S 
172. See supra Part II.A.1. 
173. See Nat’l Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Meeting 
Minutes of the Subcommittee on Health Data Needs, Standards and Security (Jan. 21–22, 1997), 
available at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/970121mn.htm. 
174. Most independent experts were university faculty. Additionally, one also represented a state 
government. See, e.g., NCVHS AT FIFTY, supra note 171; Nat’l Comm. on Vital and Health 
Statistics, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Meeting Minutes of the Subcommittee on Health Data 
Needs, Standards and Security (Nov. 5, 1997), available at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/ 
971105m1.htm (listing subcommittee members). 
175. In the healthcare context, “private industry” includes non-profit healthcare organizations 
(e.g., Kaiser Permanente, non-profit hospitals) that are not federal, state, or local governmental 
organizations. See also NCVHS AT FIFTY, supra note 171. 
176. See, e.g., Nat’l Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Subcommittee on Health Data Needs, Standards and Security Hearings on Health Information 
Privacy and Health Data Standards (June 3–4, 1997), available at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/ 
970603ag.htm; Nat’l Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Subcommittee on Health Data Needs, Standards and Security Hearings on Security (Aug. 5–7, 
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subcommittee sent its first recommendations to the Secretary. Based on 
these recommendations, HHS promulgated the first Proposed Rule 
pursuant to HIPAA section 1773(d) in August 1998.177 
The Proposed Rule received approximately 2350 public comments.178 
NCVHS was responsible for responding to most of these comments, 
with the S&S subcommittee addressing much of the technical details.179 
During the period when S&S addressed these comments, the 
Congressional deadline passed, which triggered HHS’s authority to 
promulgate regulations respecting privacy pursuant to HIPAA section 
264(c). While, as noted above, separate subcommittees of the NCVHS 
worked on privacy and on security, these subcommittees had 
overlapping membership180 and often considered related questions.181 As 
discussed above, the consultation requirement in section 264(d) lent 
further support to the NCVHS’s role and authority in the rulemaking 
process. 
Over the next several years, the NCVHS and the S&S held several 
hearings and considered the extensive comments received.182 Based on 
these actions, the S&S recommended revisions (through the full 
NCVHS) to the Security Rule and HHS promulgated the Final Rule 
based on the NCVHS’s recommendations in February 2003.183 The Final 
1997), available at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/970805ag.htm.  
177. Security and Electronic Signature Standards, 63 Fed. Reg. 43,241 (Aug. 12, 1998) (codified 
at 45 C.F.R. pt. 142). 
178. Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8333, 8335 (Feb. 20, 2003) 
(codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 162, 164). 
179. See Nat’l Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Transcript 
of the Subcommittee on Privacy and Confidentiality, Briefing on the Security Rule by the 
Subcommittee on Standards and Security (July 14, 2004), available at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/ 
040714tr.htm (discussing the process of promulgating the final rule after the proposed rule and 
comments received therefrom). 
180. Compare Nat’l Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Minutes of the Subcommittee on Privacy and Confidentiality (Feb. 25, 2000), available at 
http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/000225tr.htm, with Nat’l Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics, Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., Minutes of the Subcommittee on Standards and Security (July 13–14, 
2000) [hereinafter Minutes of the Subcommittee on Standards and Security July 13–14, 2000], 
available at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/000713mn.htm (listing five subcommittee members in 
common between the two). 
181. Compare Charge of the Subcommittee on Privacy, Confidentiality and Security, supra note 
162, with Charge of the Subcommittee on Standards, supra note 164 (showing similar issues 
“charged” to each subcommittee). 
182. See, e.g., Minutes of the Subcommittee on Standards and Security July 13–14, 2000, supra 
note 180; Nat’l Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Minutes of 
the Subcommittee on Health Data Needs, Standards and Security (Oct. 26–27, 2000), available at 
http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/001026mn.htm. 
183. Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8333. 
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Rule was substantially the work of the NCVHS, which essentially “ran 
the show” on behalf of HHS throughout the rulemaking process. 
4. Management-Based Regulatory Delegation and Security Rule 
Compliance 
As discussed above, HIPAA employs a relatively unique regulatory 
framework both in the front-end rulemaking procedures described in this 
Part and in the back-end compliance and enforcement procedures 
adopted in the Security Rule. I examine these procedures in greater 
detail in earlier work,184 but highlight here a few points relevant to this 
Article’s proposition regarding the engagement of private expertise to 
serve public interest goals. 
Unlike many regulations, HIPAA adopts a flexible form of regulation 
I describe as Management-Based Regulatory Delegation, in which the 
compliance and enforcement aspects are based upon regulated entities’ 
obligation to develop compliance plans conforming to certain aspirations 
and some specific goals, and then adhere to those goals.185 The 
compliance plans are based on requirements laid out in the Security 
Rule,186 and the Rule specifies that the degree to which an entity’s 
compliance plan must cover certain items varies with the size, 
complexity, and capabilities of the organization and the health 
information it manages.187 
Although not required by the statute, HIPAA certainly leaves room 
for this type of compliance, which has been discussed elsewhere in the 
literature and variously described as Management-Based Regulation.188 
The approach is highly flexible, well-suited to heterogeneous industries 
(of which healthcare is a prime example), and requires the substantial 
engagement of private expertise on the compliance “back-end” as each 
entity develops, self-enforces, and updates its information security 
compliance plan. It further engages private expertise by requiring 
individual regulated entities to determine, on a continuing basis, what 
184. See generally Thaw, supra note 7. 
185. See id. at 31–37. 
186. 45 C.F.R. § 160.310 (2013). 
187. Id. § 160.306. 
188. See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private 
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 692 n.2, 693–94 (2003) 
(describing management-based regulation as a concept variously referred to as “‘enforced self-
regulation’ (Braithwaite 1982), ‘mandated self-regulation’ (Bardach & Kagan 1982; Rees 1988), 
‘reflexive’ regulation (Orts 1995), or ‘process-based’ (Gunningham & Grabosky 1998) and 
‘systems-based’ (Gunningham 1996; Gunningham & Johnstone 1999) standards”). 
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are the most salient threats facing their organizations. It increases 
efficacy by shifting the cost of such decisions from the regulators to the 
individual entities and by allowing the individual entities to use their 
expertise to make such decisions, but subjecting them to regulatory 
penalty for deficiencies in so doing.189 This approach increases 
legitimacy by allowing organizations a degree of input into their 
methods of compliance, thus increasing their input into the regulatory 
compliance process. 
B. The Security Rule: Regulatory Capture Used for the Public Interest 
In previous work, I explored the nature of information security 
regulations and their effect on driving security practices in private 
organizations.190 That work examined the effects on organizations’ 
security practices using empirical data, including in-depth, semi-
structured interviews of Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) at 
key U.S. organizations. These included CISOs at several healthcare 
organizations. 
In the course of that work, I discovered that healthcare 
organizations—as substantially different than organizations in any other 
industrial sector—reported a stronger “buy-in” respecting the 
information security regulations to which they were subject.191 They 
reported working with the NCVHS in developing the HIPAA Security 
Rule, and generally evinced positive experiences in that regard.192 While 
negotiated rulemaking experienced some successes at increasing 
interested parties’ perceived legitimacy of the process, regulatory 
agencies generally are not looked upon favorably by the industries they 
regulate. This sentiment generally was also true of information security 
regulations, other than HIPAA, applicable to the organizations 
represented by my interviewees.193 
This Part explores what might explain this notably positive perception 
of HIPAA’s information security regulations. It begins with an analysis 
of literal accounts of the process, exploring NCVHS transcripts and 
meeting minutes for explanations as to why the committee members 
189. For example, failure to have a proper information security risk assessment to support the 
information security plan used for compliance purposes would violate the requirements of 45 C.F.R. 
section 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A). 
190. See generally Thaw, supra note 7. 
191. See id. at 64–66. 
192. See id. 
193. See, e.g., id. at 29. 
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worked in the public interest. It then discusses structural explanations, 
drawing on the details laid out above in Part II.A. Finally, it discusses 
technological explanations—that is, characteristics about cybersecurity 
itself might explain why the output of a committee dominated by private 
interests was so notably in the public interest. 
1. Literal Accounts “On the Ground”—HIPAA Security Rulemaking 
in Action 
As discussed above, membership on the NCVHS generally is viewed 
as a notable honor and members take their responsibilities to the public 
interest seriously. For example, in a July 1997 discussion regarding the 
role of the NCVHS in implementing the provisions of HIPAA (including 
the Security Rule), Don Detmer, acting Chairman of the NCVHS, 
described how the committee needed to act in the public interest, and 
while that might entail burdens for the organizations they represented, it 
was the committee’s responsibility to develop the rule according to 
public goals: 
The committee calls on everyone to work together on this in 
good faith. This is not an easy challenge for us. . . . [W]e are one 
of the nation’s few industrially developed countries that does not 
have anything like this. . . . [W]e ought to do it because it is the 
right thing to do. The point is though, health information 
becomes available for other uses. So unless we get this in place, 
and get it in fairly soon, we see both risk to patients as well as 
risks to the record keepers themselves will grow. We believe 
that everyone will benefit by a well-crafted set of fair 
information practices. It will impose constraints and restrictions 
on industry, but I think those are just part of what it is going to 
appropriately take to be right by this, to the society at large and 
individual patients.194 
On its face, this language might appear to be superficial. However, 
both the outcome of the Final Rule itself195 and the comments of other 
members of the committee suggest otherwise, that in fact the members 
were focused on the public good notwithstanding their private interests. 
Consider the statement of one individual representing a major health 
insurance carrier: 
194. Detmer, supra note 153. 
195. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. 104-191, sec. 
262(a), § 1173(d), 110 Stat. 1936, 2025–26 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d) 
(2012)). 
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On behalf of the management of United HealthCare, I’m happy 
to be a part of this session and to assist in any way I 
can. . . . United HealthCare has consistently supported the 
incremental market reform principles underlying 
[HIPAA]. . . . In general, the Federal reforms espoused by the 
Act will help stabilize and sustain the private market by ensuring 
that all market players compete under the same high standards. 
United HealthCare views protecting our member’s confidential 
information to be of the utmost importance. We have explicit 
information security policies and standards that are mandated by 
executive management and widely disseminated for compliance 
within the corporation.196 
This response is particularly notable in the context of this Article 
because it demonstrates how the structure of HIPAA and the function of 
the NCVHS appear to have aligned private incentives with the public 
interest. 
In addition to a general commitment to the process, the members of 
the S&S subcommittee also demonstrated a belief that if they failed to 
act, other regulators or legislators would, and that would be a sub-
optimal outcome because the NCVHS was the most appropriate entity 
and a patchwork of inconsistent local rules would both be inefficient and 
possibly otherwise inferior: 
I think that we really do believe that that is as important for the 
implementation side of this, as well as obviously the fact that if 
we do not do it, states will continue to do their own approach to 
this. . . . [T]o have a thousand or 50 different experiments going 
on in the country really is not necessarily in the best interests. 
First of all, people cross state lines a lot for health care and 
employment and such. A lot of the population, about 50 percent, 
is near a state border, so that becomes very problematic if people 
have different policies in all these jurisdictions.197 
The minutes and transcripts of the NCVHS meetings suggest a 
general feeling that if they failed to advise the Secretary and suggest a 
rule, someone else would—and the outcome would be less than 
desirable. My CISO interviews support this viewpoint, and recent 
196. Randolph N. Sanovic, Director, Information Security, United HealthCare Corporation, 
Testimony to the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics, Subcommittee on Health Data 
Needs, Standards, and Security, Hearing to Receive Input from the Health Care Industry on 
Recommendations for Security Standards (Aug. 5–6, 1997), available at 
http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/970805tc.htm. 
197. Detmer, supra note 153. 
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informal interviews with knowledgeable parties concur.198 
Additionally, the committee members viewed their work not just as 
“merely advisory,” but also as having the opportunity to make rules with 
the force of law: 
The committee calls on everyone to work together on this in 
good faith. This is not an easy challenge for us. The probability 
candidly that we can pass a law that will be perfect is very 
unlikely. I think the issue is, can we in fact pass solid legislation 
that will at least get us benchmarked and on the right 
track . . . . None of these benefits will be achieved unless 
everyone approaches the legislative process with a spirit of 
compromise.199 
As discussed further in Part III, this belief that the committee had 
effective rulemaking authority was an important component structuring 
the incentives for participants to put forth their best effort toward public 
goals. The committee members appear to view their activities with the 
responsibility of being a miniature legislature, as noted by the language 
used and their commitment to (their opinion of what is in) the public 
interest discussed earlier in this part. 
2. Structural Explanations: Statutory, Regulatory, and Incentives 
Analysis 
Part I and the preceding sections of this Part discuss the structure of 
negotiated rulemaking proceedings and of HIPAA and the NCVHS. The 
analysis in those portions suggests substantial differences between 
HIPAA and other consensual rulemaking proceedings, differences that 
may suggest improvements for consensual rulemaking and means by 
which regulatory capture may be harnessed to leverage private expertise 
to act in the public good. Part III explores these possibilities in detail. 
This Part analyzes the structural incentives present in the HIPAA 
Security Rule regulatory process as groundwork for that discussion in 
Part III. 
198. I am currently initiating a follow-on empirical research project to the original CISO 
interviews, which will include interviews with additional knowledgeable parties. As such work 
constitutes the use of human subjects, and a final protocol has not yet been approved by an 
Institutional Review Board, I cannot yet report the results of informal interviews or the identity of 
the interviewees. Additionally, consistent with the human subjects protocol approved for the CISO 
interviews, I cannot report the identity of the organizations represented by the individuals as doing 
so would likely implicitly identify the relevant individuals. As soon as this information becomes 
available, I will publish appropriate revisions identifying the source(s) of this information to the 
extent permitted under the rules of that protocol. 
199. See Detmer, supra note 153 (emphasis added). 
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As discussed above, the HIPAA consultation requirement for the 
Security Rule gave strong capture authority to the NCVHS. The NCVHS 
statute requires committee composition including both private industry 
interests and experts in the relevant fields. The committee procedures 
were by majority vote, although consensus was desirable. The 
combination of these limitations creates an uncommon incentive 
structure for participants. While the committee itself does have effective 
strong capture over the rulemaking process, unlike negotiated 
rulemaking no single member has veto authority. Thus rather than 
driving toward a least-common-denominator rule, individual parties are 
incentivized to cooperate with one another as much as possible. 
At a minimum, they must cooperate sufficiently to achieve a majority 
interest. The inclusion of subject matter experts, who usually are 
university faculty or similar researchers, adds an interesting dimension 
to this process. While in the S&S committee example, industry 
technically held a 4–3 majority vote, were they to exercise this power to 
advance private interests such action would be as clear and apparent as a 
lightning strike at midnight. Given the mission of the NCVHS, and the 
cultural norm that it operates in the public interest, such activities would 
likely not result in the Secretary adopting the recommendations 
particularly over the objections of relevant experts. Under these 
circumstances, a departure by HHS from the NCVHS recommendations 
would likely survive judicial review of the consultation requirement—a 
condition unlikely to be the case in the absence of dissent by experts.200 
Thus, representatives of private industry have statutorily created 
incentives to work with subject matter experts, placing meaningful 
limitations on their ability to advance their own private agendas. 
Furthermore, with most of the subject matter experts being university 
faculty holding tenure, those experts’ job security provides an additional 
layer of protection against influence.201 
200. See Mississippi v. EPA, No. 08-1200, 2013 WL 3799741 (D.C. Cir. July 23, 2013) (holding 
that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was required to provide adequate technical 
explanation for its departure from the recommendations of an advisory committee whose 
recommendations it was otherwise required by statute to adopt, and overturning regulations 
promulgated contrary to the recommendations of that committee on the basis that the EPA’s 
justification was insufficient and thus violated the organic statute authorizing the Agency’s 
regulatory authority). 
201. While this protection is, of course, not absolute—some have argued that faculty might, for 
example, be subject to influence as a function of corporate research funding—faculty with tenure 
certainly are less subject to influence than any at-will employee of a private organization. 
Additionally, universities themselves infrequently have private agendas at the institutional level, and 
thus individual faculty are further isolated from having such agendas and more likely to act in (at 
least their own expert perception of) the public interest. 
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3. Technological Explanations 
A core component of HIPAA and its Administrative Simplification 
requirements was to promote the safe and efficient interchange of health 
information among healthcare providers, insurers, and other related 
entities.202 Promoting this type of information interchange remains a 
primary goal of the industry203 and the current Executive Branch.204 In a 
networked information exchange, however, the choices of one bad actor 
have implications far beyond the boundaries of that single actor. Much 
like a series of security guards protecting a facility, if one guard turns 
out to be in collusion with a gang of thieves and lets them in a back 
door, the activities of the other guards successfully protecting their doors 
will not make up for the “weak link in the chain.” 
Information security is precisely similar. When health information is 
shared among many entities, any single one of those entities could be the 
“weak link” through which that information is compromised. From the 
perspective of an attacker, it does not matter where they obtain the 
information—the value is the same whether they get it from a hospital, 
an insurance company, or the dumpster behind a local doctor’s medical 
offices. From the perspective of the patient-consumer, it reflects badly 
upon the entire system any time there is such a compromise, because 
that patient-consumer likely only provided the information once—at the 
point-of-care. 
The result is a situation in which the potential negative externalities 
from one organization having deficient information security measures 
are sufficient to incentivize other organizations to seek regulatory 
enforcement of reasonable levels of security for all participants in the 
system. For example, while United HealthCare might take the privacy 
and security of its consumers’ data very seriously—as suggested by the 
excerpt in Part II.B.1 above—a failure by one of its vendors or providers 
could cause that information to be compromised. Thus even though 
202. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA), Pub. L. 104-191, 
§ 262, 110 Stat. 1936, 2021 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
203. Health Information Exchange Governance, HEALTHIT.GOV, http://www.healthit.gov/ 
policy-researchers-implementers/health-information-exchange-governance (last visited Aug. 4, 
2013) (discussing major health information exchange goals of interoperability, increased trust 
among all participants, and decreased cost and complexity). 
204. President Obama Shows Successes in Health Information Technology Field, HEALTH 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT INDUSTRY NEWS, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO, 
http://healthinformatics.uic.edu/president-obama-shows-successes-in-the-health-information-
technology-field/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2014) (discussing President Obama’s remarks about health 
information exchange during his State of the Union address in 2011). 
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information security regulations might not be to United’s specific 
competitive advantage, and may even impose additional regulatory 
compliance costs, United may nonetheless be incentivized to support 
such regulation so that they may have confidence in the business 
partners with whom they exchange information. 
The result is a circumstance in which the risk of negative externalities 
suggests that regulated entities will accept a higher level of constraint of 
their private interests than otherwise might be the case. Stated 
differently, the nature of an interconnected information system aligns 
certain incentives—particularly those pertaining information security—
such that private entities’ interests coincide with the public interest. 
C. Is Cybersecurity Different? 
These technological explanations beg the question whether 
information security is, by nature, also unique, thus suggesting that 
private actors working for the public good may be an exception not 
applicable to other circumstances. Before considering what lessons 
cybersecurity regulation may teach, therefore, I consider whether the 
cybersecurity example should be generalized. 
There are two particularly obvious objections to generalizing from 
cybersecurity: (1) that it is highly technical; and (2) that cybersecurity’s 
interconnected nature renders the negative externalities of one actor’s 
failure disproportionately costly. While both objections bear merit, 
neither is dispositive and at most both serve to limit, rather than exclude, 
applicability of lessons learned from cybersecurity regulation. 
The idea that a highly technical subject would distinguish 
cybersecurity regulation from other regulation overlooks one of the core 
purposes of administrative agencies. In a highly complex society, 
agencies develop and maintain the necessary expertise to fill in the 
technical details that legislatures simply lack the time to address.205 As 
noted by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. 
Mistretta,206 the creation of non-binding guidelines for judges sentencing 
convicted criminals under federal law is a highly technical topic.207 As 
205. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Eight Things Americans Can’t Figure Out 
About Controlling Administrative Power, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 5, 6 & n.2 (2009) (“Justice Blackman 
noted the Supreme Court’s implementation of the nondelegation doctrine has been driven by ‘a 
practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever-changing and 
more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power 
under broad general directives.’” (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1988))). 
206. 488 U.S. 361. 
207. See id. at 372. 
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noted in Part I, industries such as education, environmental protection, 
and aviation are also highly technical in nature. Nothing about the 
technical nature cybersecurity suggests that it is any different than other 
highly technical subjects from a regulatory standpoint.208 Thus, this 
objection does not suggest a limit on the applicability of lessons learned 
from cybersecurity regulation. 
The comparatively higher cost of negative externalities from 
individual deficient actors in cybersecurity may suggest a limitation on 
the industries to which lessons learned from cybersecurity regulation are 
applicable. As discussed above in Part II.B.3, the potential impact on all 
actors of a single actor’s deficiency may be substantial. The resultant 
incentives for actors to override their individual interests and seek more 
stringent regulations for all could thus be different than in industries 
where such potential negative externalities from deficient compliance 
are not present. In considering the degree to which regulatory capture in 
healthcare cybersecurity may be replicable for other rulemaking, 
therefore, the presence of increased cost from negative externalities of 
individually deficient actors should be considered. 
III. THE GENERAL CASE: HARNESSING PRIVATE EXPERTISE 
FOR PUBLIC INTEREST GOALS 
When Philip Harter first proposed the concept of negotiated 
rulemaking and laid out the nine factors suggesting circumstances for 
which it was appropriate, his approach was speculative—a proposal he 
viewed as addressing the then-current “malaise.” As mentioned in the 
Introduction, in recent years some scholars have revisited this style of 
speculation—looking for solutions to engage private expertise and 
improve the legitimacy and efficacy of the regulatory process through 
various degrees of capture. Alternatively stated, such approaches engage 
a form of what Kenneth Bamberger describes as regulatory delegation, 
in which agencies entrust certain of their decision-making powers to 
private parties through various mechanisms.209 
These approaches, however, lack empirical validation. Part II of this 
Article provides that validation—the healthcare cybersecurity example 
208. The one possible exception—that I suggest does not bear on the question at hand—is that the 
rate of development of new technology in computing and information technologies appears to 
notably exceed that of other industries. This rate-of-change suggests the importance of flexible 
regulations, see generally Thaw, supra note 7, but does not suggest that cybersecurity is any 
different in a manner that would incentivize representatives of private industry to act in the public 
interest any more than would representatives of other industrial sectors. 
209. See generally Bamberger, supra note 22. 
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demonstrates a clear case where an administrative agency engaged 
private expertise through legislatively imposed regulatory capture. 
Notwithstanding this capture, the private interests at the table utilized 
their private expertise not only primarily to serve public interests, but 
also sometimes even at the expense of their own private interests.210 
Building on that example, and preceding analysis that the healthcare 
cybersecurity example is not an isolated circumstance inapplicable to 
other cases, this Part proposes two conclusions representing important 
steps forward in our understanding of the interaction between regulation 
and private expertise. First, it proposes a set of characteristics about a 
regulatory problem suggestive that the healthcare cybersecurity style of 
capture may be effective at engaging private expertise for public goals. 
Second, it proposes a list of industries best suited to those 
characteristics—an effective research agenda for future empirical work 
investigating the applicability of such a “capture process” in practice. 
Finally, it concludes by suggesting a description of what that capture 
process might look like in the generic case. I describe this process as 
Enlightened Regulatory Capture. 
A. Enlightened Regulatory Capture: Characteristics When Regulatory 
Capture Can Be Used to Engage Private Expertise for Public 
Goals 
The healthcare cybersecurity example describes a circumstance when 
regulatory capture engaged private expertise to advance public goals. 
Though they were representatives of private interests—with legislatively 
mandated capture over the rulemaking process—the individuals 
involved in writing the HIPAA Security Rule nonetheless used their 
private expertise in the public interest. Their activities thus constitute a 
form of enlightened self-interest, suggesting the descriptive title 
Enlightened Regulatory Capture. 
Five general characteristics of Enlightened Regulatory Capture (ERC) 
are present in the healthcare cybersecurity example: (1) the capture 
function is enforced by rule; (2) there is a perceived detriment to the 
participants and their industry as a whole if the process fails; (3) 
procedural constraints are relaxed, requiring only majority approval to 
act; (4) “reduced-bias” subject matter experts are mandated by rule as 
participants; and (5) the participants have incentives creating a 
commitment to the process other than the opportunity to advance their 
private interests. 
210. See supra Part II.B.1; supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
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The most critical aspect of ERC is that the capture function is 
enforced by rule. The participants must believe that their work will 
necessarily become part of the rule that is adopted. This is similar to, but 
more expansive than, Harter’s “inevitability of decision” factor.211 In 
Part I, I considered two cases of regulation regarding the NCLB—one by 
the DOI, and one by the DOE. The organic statute differs notably 
between these two cases—both specify the use of negotiated rulemaking, 
but the DOI has no exemption for it, whereas the DOE has an 
exemption. As discussed in the analysis of those examples, the “weaker” 
version of capture is likely one of the reasons the DOI example is noted 
as a negotiated rulemaking “success” whereas the DOE example is 
regarded by the literature as a negotiated rulemaking failure.212 
Additionally, as discussed in Part II, the consultation requirement that 
effectively caused HHS to turn over the rulemaking process to the 
NCVHS contributed both to the committee members’ perception of their 
authority213 and their willingness to act in the public interest—rather 
than fighting with competitors to advance their own interests. 
The second characteristic is that the participants must believe they 
have a stake in the game—that some negative consequence will result 
for their individual interests or for the interests of the industry they 
represent as a whole, or both, should they fail. In the case of healthcare 
cybersecurity, a failure could exacerbate the negative externalities 
problem, allow the patchwork of inconsistent state laws to continue, and 
possibly result in a perceived loss of the prestige members felt at being 
nominated to serve on the NCVHS for failing to fulfill the 
responsibilities of their appointment. This is not dissimilar from Harter’s 
“opportunity for gain” factor,214 but is far more expansive and 
contemplates a countervailing opportunity for loss as well. 
Third, procedural constraints must be far more relaxed than the 
consensus requirement present in negotiated rulemaking. As discussed 
throughout this Article, the consensus requirement often results in a 
minimization effect—where the unilateral veto power held by each 
participant on a negotiated rulemaking committee results in that outcome 
which is the least-common-denominator to all interests at the table. 
While this process may be desirable for certain circumstances,215 it 
211. See Harter, supra note 3, at 47–48. 
212. See generally Holley-Walker, supra note 82. 
213. See supra note 199. 
214. See Harter, supra note 3, at 48–49. 
215. Ironically, Harter describes the negotiated rulemaking process as being ill-suited to 
circumstances when parties have differences in fundamental values. See id. at 49–50. Yet the 
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seems ill-suited to many rulemakings and (as discussed in Part I) is often 
the source of substantial criticism of negotiated rulemaking. In the 
healthcare cybersecurity example, only a majority was required for 
NCVHS action. As discussed in Part II, this majority requirement was a 
key component to forcing participants that might otherwise have private 
agendas to work collaboratively and to preventing any participants from 
gaining “internal capture” through unilateral veto power. 
The fourth requirement, that there be mandatory “reduced-bias” 
subject matter experts as participants, strongly integrates with the third 
requirement of relaxed procedural rules. In the healthcare cybersecurity 
example, the presence of and general characteristics of these experts 
were mandated by statute. The concept of a “reduced-bias” expert is an 
individual who is less susceptible to influence as a function of their 
employment than is an at-will employee of a private organization or a 
professional whose primary compensation depends upon providing 
services to private organizations. The most prevalent example of this 
type of expert is a tenured member of a university faculty, which, as 
discussed above, was the case in the healthcare cybersecurity example. 
As discussed in more detail in Part II, the relaxed procedural rules work 
together with this requirement by forcing private interests to work 
together with these reduced-bias experts, thereby in turn reducing their 
ability to advance private agendas at the expense of the public interest. 
The third and fourth characteristics together describe an essential 
component of the function and character of ERC. ERC is well-suited 
when interested parties, at minimum, can be capable of working 
collaboratively toward resolution. By contrast, if fundamental 
differences that cannot be overcome by restrictions on unilateral veto 
power that render collaboration impossible, then ERC’s suitability 
substantially decreases. Ironically, as discussed above, negotiated 
rulemaking—which Harter claims is not well-suited to fundamental 
differences—may in fact be better suited to such circumstances.216 
Finally, consistent with this collaborative function, the fifth 
characteristic requires that the participants have a commitment to the 
process beyond the mere opportunity to advance their private interests. 
counter-majoritarian nature of each participant having unilateral veto power—as found in most 
negotiated rulemaking proceedings—is precisely the type of constraint that could force parties with 
fundamentally different values to come together for discussion. As discussed in Part I, this was in 
fact the mechanism that allowed the FAA to proceed with its negotiated rulemaking regarding flight 
duty/rest requirements and, notwithstanding the fact that a consensus was not reached, the process 
largely was regarded as a success because it brought the parties closer together. See Perritt, supra 
note 95, at 1670–71. 
216. See supra note 215. 
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Harter describes the participants as needing to have the “opportunity to 
gain.”217 But the mere opportunity to gain is not sufficient, as evidenced 
by the DOE example discussed above and in greater detail in Part I. The 
parties must have some other factors that incentivize them to participate 
in the process not just for personal gain, or private interests may 
ultimately take over even the best-intentioned of individuals. Several 
such factors were present in the healthcare cybersecurity example. As 
discussed in detail in Part II, committee membership on the NCVHS was 
considered an honor to which obligation to act in the public interest 
attached. Members accordingly took this responsibility quite seriously, 
even at times to the possible expense of the private interests they 
represented. The risk of negative externalities described above and in 
greater detail in Part II also contributed to members’ incentives in this 
regard. Additionally, the possibility of “getting it right” so that the 
continued patchwork of inefficient (and possibly technologically 
inferior) state-level regulations would not continue presented an 
opportunity for positive externalities to be realized by the process. 
The characteristics presented here are neither an exhaustive list nor 
are they necessarily required for ERC to be an effective approach. They 
represent preliminary suggestions, generalizing characteristics from the 
first instance presented in the literature of a verifiable example of 
regulatory capture working clearly in the public interest.218 As noted 
above, other scholars’ writing suggests they are conducting similar 
empirical analysis, and such work should serve as an opportunity to 
refine the characteristics presented here. 
B. An Empirical Research Agenda: Industries Potentially Suitable to 
Enlightened Regulatory Capture 
The characteristics described above and the analysis in Part I suggest 
some examples of industries where ERC may be capable of achieving 
superior results to existing rulemaking procedures. The examples 
presented here are not an exhaustive list—many other industrial sectors 
are worth exploration—but rather represent a preliminary research 
agenda for industries where the analysis in this Article suggests further 
empirical investigation, similar to that in Part II, may be appropriate. 
Education is the most striking example resulting from the analysis in 
this Article. As noted above, key statutory differences between 
217. See Harter, supra note 3, at 48–49. 
218. This is the first such example, to the best of the author’s knowledge, as of the time of this 
writing. 
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negotiated rulemaking requirements for the NCLB between the DOE’s 
and the DOI’s proceedings produced vastly different outcomes. This 
stark perceived difference in legitimacy and efficacy of the proceedings, 
which turned heavily on the difference in the degree of regulatory 
capture encoded in the statute, suggests that exploring ERC in the 
education context is a worthwhile endeavor. The primary characteristic 
described above is, as noted here, the key distinction between the 
success and failure in this education example. Further empirical 
evidence would be required to determine if the other characteristics are 
or could be true for education regulation. 
Labor regulation may be another example where ERC can be 
successful. As noted in the FAA flight crew rest requirements and duty 
restrictions example described in Part I, strong disagreement among the 
parties prevented the negotiated rulemaking proceeding from reaching 
consensus. While the FAA had committed to publishing a rule if the 
committee suggested one, satisfying (at least in part) the primary ERC 
characteristic, the deep divisions among the committee participants and 
the unilateral veto authority inherent in consensual rulemaking prevented 
the process from achieving a regulation. If, in fact, there is a cognizable 
public interest in this issue—as likely there is, given the public safety 
and economic efficiency concerns at stake—the relaxed procedural 
requirements described in the third characteristic above may have 
facilitated better agreement. Additionally, the inclusion of reduced-bias 
experts in conjunction with relaxed requirements may have increased the 
efficacy of the process. Further empirical study of course is necessary, 
but labor regulation appears to be a promising example. Additionally, 
given the inextricably linked aspects of air traffic regulation, this 
example also suggests that transportation regulation may be a ripe area 
for examination of the applicability of ERC. 
Finally, environmental regulation also seems worth exploration. As 
noted by Cary Coglianese219 and Kenneth Bamberger,220 environmental 
protection involves the regulation of heterogeneous industries and often 
involves the application of flexible standards, similar to the 
circumstances described in the healthcare cybersecurity example.221 It 
bears an obvious public interest and there are reduced-bias experts on 
university faculties whose technical expertise could be harnessed. 
219. See generally Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 188. 
220. See generally Bamberger, supra note 22. 
221. See id. at 390; Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 188, at 700. 
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C. Enlightened Regulatory Capture: A Hypothetical Example 
How might a legislature, wishing to adopt Enlightened Regulatory 
Capture, proceed in drafting statutes to enable this concept? This Part 
proposes a modest set of preliminary recommendations for legislators 
that will likely be common to any successful implementation. These 
recommendations come with an important cautionary note—as discussed 
throughout this Article, regulated entities incentives and challenges vary 
widely across industrial sectors and in some cases within industries. No 
single formula is likely to be correct, and legislators must take care to 
consider the incentives at play for any given implementation. 
First, and perhaps most importantly, the legislature should mandate 
adoption of ERC by expressly requiring the administrative agency to 
adopt the recommendations of the committee the agency is charged to 
consult. Limited exceptions may be provided in the statute, but should 
not provide discretionary exception to override the recommendations of 
the committee. 
Second, committee composition should also be encoded by statute. 
Appointments should be made primarily by the agency, but perhaps 
allowing for limited legislative or executive appointment as was the case 
in the healthcare cybersecurity example. The committee should be of 
manageable size, allowing for functional meetings and discussion 
without the need for continual, strict adherence to rules of order. 
Statutory authority should also direct that committee membership 
include reduced-bias subject matter experts in relevant fields in addition 
to representatives from relevant industry and other interested parties. 
The committee should be governed by the FACA or similar statute. 
Third, procedural rules should be relaxed. As procedural rules may 
have many variants, legislatures may wish to delegate the precise details 
to the relevant agency, but with constraints at least to prevent the 
unilateral-veto problem present in negotiated rulemaking. If reduced-
bias subject matter experts are included in sufficient number on 
committees, then a legislatively encoded default of majority rule may be 
sufficient provided agencies are given some flexibility to tailor the 
outcome. 
Finally, the legislature should attempt to make committee 
participation worthwhile beyond the opportunity for participants to 
advance their private interests. In the healthcare cybersecurity example, 
the long-standing nature of the NCVHS and the opportunities it afforded 
resulted in a form of prestige being associated with membership on the 
committee. While such factors are difficult to encode directly into 
legislation, one modest suggestion would be to use existing, long-
standing committees or, in the absence of such committees, to create by 
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statute a new committee that would exist for at least a specified (and 
sufficiently lengthy) duration to make the participants’ engagement be 
perceived as worthwhile. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article began with the proposition that, contrary to commonly 
accepted wisdom, certain forms of regulatory capture may be used to 
advance public, rather than private, goals. It examined a curious example 
where, in the process of authorizing HSS to promulgate healthcare 
cybersecurity regulations, a confluence of factors and Congressional 
drafting created a circumstance under which private entities with strong 
regulatory capture over the rulemaking process “checked their private 
agendas at the door” and focused on using their expertise to achieve the 
public goals articulated by Congress. 
For several decades now, scholars have debated whether private 
expertise can be effectively harnessed via negotiated rulemaking to 
advance public goals. Some scholars reject such rulemaking procedures 
because of their vulnerability to internal capture. This Article presents 
the first verifiable empirical case of regulatory capture by an advisory 
committee comprising private interests being used for the public good. 
The empirical work surrounding the healthcare cybersecurity example is 
the beginning of a research effort, partially laid out in the last Part of this 
Article, examining methods to engage private expertise for public goals. 
While further empirical research is necessary, the results presented 
here suggest two conclusions. First, harnessing private expertise for 
public goals is possible, and can be accomplished through ERC. Second, 
legislatures can and should experiment with this design, using the 
baseline framework discussed in Part III as a starting point. 
 
 
